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From: "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <gw@idfusion.org>
To: Kenneth Goldman <kgoldman@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	greg@enjellic.com,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:38:29 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170214143829.GA28175@wind.enjellic.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <OFA049276F.2B32440E-ON852580C3.00742287-852580C3.00748E6B@notes.na.collabserv.com>

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 04:13:05PM -0500, Kenneth Goldman wrote:

Good morning to everyone.

> James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote on 
> 02/10/2017 11:46:03 AM:
> 
> > > quote: 810 milliseconds
> > > verify signature: 635 milliseconds

For those who may be interested in this sort of thing I grabbed a few
minutes and ran these basic verification primitives against a Kaby
Lake system.

Average time for a quote is 600 milliseconds with a signature
verification clocking in at 100 milliseconds.  The latter is
consistent with what James found on his Skylake machine.

Latencies are still significant with things like container start
times.

> > Part of the way of reducing the latency is not to use the TPM for
> > things that don't require secrecy: 

> Agreed.  There are a few times one would verify a signature inside the 
> TPM,
> but they're far from mainstream:
> 
> 1 - Early in the boot cycle, when there's no crypto library.
> 
> 2 - When the crypto library doesn't support the required algorithm.
> 
> 3 - When a ticket is needed to prove to the TPM later that it verified
> the signature.

I don't think there is any doubt that running cryptographic primitives
in userspace is going to be faster then going to hardware.  Obviously
that also means there is no need for a TPM resource manager which has
been the subject of much discussion here.

The CoreOS paper makes significant reference to increased security
guarantees inherent in the use of a TPM.  Obviously whatever uses
those are will have the noted latency constraints.

We have extended our behavior measurement verifications to the
container level so we offer an explicit guarantee that a container has
not operated in a manner which is inconsistent with the intent of its
designer.  Getting the security guarantee we need requires that an
linkage to a hardware root of trust hence our concerns about hardware
latency.

Have a good day.

As always,
Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D.   Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
4206 N. 19th Ave.           Specializing in information infra-structure
Fargo, ND  58102            development.
PH: 701-281-1686
FAX: 701-281-3949           EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"UNIX is simple and coherent, but it takes a genious (or at any rate,
 a programmer) to understand and appreciate its simplicity."
                                -- Dennis Ritchie
                                   USENIX '87

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-02-14 14:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-10 10:03 [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion Dr. Greg Wettstein
2017-02-10 16:46 ` James Bottomley
2017-02-12 20:29   ` Ken Goldman
     [not found]   ` <OFA049276F.2B32440E-ON852580C3.00742287-852580C3.00748E6B@notes.na.collabserv.com>
2017-02-14 14:38     ` Dr. Greg Wettstein [this message]
2017-02-14 16:47       ` James Bottomley
     [not found]       ` <71dc0e80-6678-a124-9184-1f93c8532d09@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-02-16 20:06         ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
2017-02-16 20:33           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-02-17  9:56             ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
2017-02-17 12:37               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-02-17 22:37                 ` Dr. Greg Wettstein
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-02-09  9:06 Dr. Greg Wettstein
2017-02-09 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-02-09 19:04   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-02-09 19:29     ` James Bottomley
2017-02-09 21:54       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-02-10  8:48     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-02-09 19:24 ` James Bottomley
2017-02-09 20:05 ` James Bottomley
2017-01-18 20:48 James Bottomley
2017-01-19 12:25 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-01-19 12:41   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
     [not found]     ` <o6gdhu$li$1@blaine.gmane.org>
2017-01-27 21:59       ` James Bottomley
2017-01-19 12:59   ` James Bottomley
2017-01-20 13:40     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
     [not found] ` <o6gese$pev$1@blaine.gmane.org>
2017-01-27 22:04   ` James Bottomley
2017-01-27 23:35     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-01-27 23:48       ` James Bottomley
2017-01-30  0:52     ` Ken Goldman
2017-01-30 16:04       ` [tpmdd-devel] " James Bottomley
2017-01-30 21:58         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-01-30 22:13           ` James Bottomley
2017-01-31 13:31             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
     [not found]         ` <o6qog0$30l$1@blaine.gmane.org>
2017-01-31 19:55           ` James Bottomley

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