From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: "Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
"linux-s390@vger.kernel.org" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 13:34:19 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170323203419.GA62859@beast> (raw)
This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall return
still sees USER_DS during the new VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE checks.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 1 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 67d27be60405..3b4976396ec4 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ZERO_SUB(void);
void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ZERO_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
+void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
/* lkdtm_heap.c */
void lkdtm_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION(void);
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
index e3f4cd8876b5..4906e53a6df3 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
struct lkdtm_list {
struct list_head node;
@@ -279,3 +280,22 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void)
else
pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
}
+
+void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Test that USER_DS has been set correctly on exiting a syscall.
+ * Since setting this higher than USER_DS (TASK_SIZE) would introduce
+ * an exploitable condition, we lower it instead, since that should
+ * not create as large a problem on an unprotected system.
+ */
+ mm_segment_t lowfs;
+#ifdef MAKE_MM_SEG
+ lowfs = MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE);
+#else
+ lowfs = TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE;
+#endif
+
+ pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
+ set_fs(lowfs);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index b9a4cd4a9b68..42d2b8e31e6b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(OVERFLOW),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_ADD),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
+ CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_USER_DS),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK),
CRASHTYPE(UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE),
CRASHTYPE(OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION),
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next reply other threads:[~2017-03-23 20:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-23 20:34 Kees Cook [this message]
2017-03-24 8:14 ` [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test Heiko Carstens
2017-03-24 15:17 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-24 15:24 ` Christian Borntraeger
2017-03-24 16:11 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-24 17:46 ` Kees Cook
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