From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756092AbdCXIQI (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Mar 2017 04:16:08 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:60465 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752405AbdCXIPH (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Mar 2017 04:15:07 -0400 Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 09:14:50 +0100 From: Heiko Carstens To: Kees Cook Cc: Thomas Garnier , Martin Schwidefsky , David Howells , Arnd Bergmann , Dave Hansen , Al Viro , Thomas Gleixner , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Ren=E9?= Nyffenegger , Andrew Morton , "Paul E . McKenney" , Ingo Molnar , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Tikhomirov , Stephen Smalley , Ingo Molnar , "H . Peter Anvin" , Andy Lutomirski , Paolo Bonzini , Rik van Riel , Josh Poimboeuf , Borislav Petkov , Brian Gerst , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Christian Borntraeger , Russell King , Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , Mark Rutland , James Morse , "linux-s390@vger.kernel.org" , LKML , Linux API , "x86@kernel.org" , "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" Subject: Re: [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test References: <20170323203419.GA62859@beast> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170323203419.GA62859@beast> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 17032408-0040-0000-0000-000003504312 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17032408-0041-0000-0000-000024A8E6EA Message-Id: <20170324081450.GA5891@osiris> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-03-24_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1702020001 definitions=main-1703240075 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 01:34:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall return > still sees USER_DS during the new VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE checks. > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook ... > +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void) > +{ > + /* > + * Test that USER_DS has been set correctly on exiting a syscall. > + * Since setting this higher than USER_DS (TASK_SIZE) would introduce > + * an exploitable condition, we lower it instead, since that should > + * not create as large a problem on an unprotected system. > + */ > + mm_segment_t lowfs; > +#ifdef MAKE_MM_SEG > + lowfs = MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE); > +#else > + lowfs = TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE; > +#endif > + > + pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n"); > + set_fs(lowfs); > +} This won't work on architectures where the set_fs() argument does not contain an address but an address space identifier. This is true e.g. for s390 and as far as I know also for sparc. On s390 we have complete distinct address spaces for kernel and user space that each start at address zero.