From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758082AbdELUbb (ORCPT ); Fri, 12 May 2017 16:31:31 -0400 Received: from merlin.infradead.org ([205.233.59.134]:52646 "EHLO merlin.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757293AbdELUb3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 12 May 2017 16:31:29 -0400 Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 22:30:44 +0200 From: Peter Zijlstra To: Russell King - ARM Linux Cc: Kees Cook , Linus Torvalds , Mark Rutland , Kernel Hardening , Greg KH , Heiko Carstens , LKML , David Howells , Dave Hansen , "H . Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , Pavel Tikhomirov , linux-s390 , the arch/x86 maintainers , Will Deacon , Christian Borntraeger , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Ren=E9?= Nyffenegger , Catalin Marinas , "Paul E . McKenney" , Rik van Riel , Arnd Bergmann , Brian Gerst , Borislav Petkov , Al Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Josh Poimboeuf , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , Linux API , Oleg Nesterov , Daniel Micay , James Morse , "Eric W . Biederman" , Martin Schwidefsky , Paolo Bonzini , Andrew Morton , Thomas Garnier , "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Message-ID: <20170512203044.GI4626@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> References: <20170512072802.5a686f23@mschwideX1> <20170512075458.09a3a1ce@mschwideX1> <20170512202106.GO22219@n2100.armlinux.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170512202106.GO22219@n2100.armlinux.org.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.22.1 (2013-10-16) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 09:21:06PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote: > On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 12:30:02PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > I'm clearly not explaining things well enough. I shouldn't say > > "corruption", I should say "malicious manipulation". The methodology > > of attacks against the stack are quite different from the other kinds > > of attacks like use-after-free, heap overflow, etc. Being able to > > exhaust the kernel stack (either due to deep recursion or unbounded > > alloca()) > > I really hope we don't have alloca() use in the kernel. Do you have > evidence to support that assertion? > > IMHO alloca() (or similar) should not be present in any kernel code > because we have a limited stack - we have kmalloc() etc for that kind > of thing. On stack variable length arrays get implemented by the compiler doing alloca(), and we sadly have a few of those around. But yes, fully agreed on the desirability of alloca() and things.