From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932301AbdEUVae (ORCPT ); Sun, 21 May 2017 17:30:34 -0400 Received: from zeniv.linux.org.uk ([195.92.253.2]:51008 "EHLO ZenIV.linux.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757035AbdEUVac (ORCPT ); Sun, 21 May 2017 17:30:32 -0400 Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 22:30:29 +0100 From: Al Viro To: Richard Weinberger Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, hch@lst.de Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] um: Remove proc command from mconsole Message-ID: <20170521213029.GB390@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <1495401543-6314-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1495401543-6314-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at> User-Agent: Mutt/1.8.0 (2017-02-23) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 11:19:03PM +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote: > This feature is another abuser of set_fs(). > Reading proc files from the host side is a debugging feature > with no security checks at all. The path is not sanitized, therefore > any file could be read. ITYM "any file on procfs" > Let's get rid of it. Wait a sec - guest is not protected against anyone with mconsole access anyway. > Unless I miss something is feature is not ABI since it was addeded for > debugging UML only. It is broken wrt. security and abuses set_fs(). > I think we can just remove it. IDGI. set_fs() abuses are trivial - just switch to kernel_read() and be done with that...