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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool
Date: Tue,  6 Jun 2017 19:47:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170606174804.31124-3-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170606174804.31124-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>

This enables users of get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long} to wait until
the pool is ready before using this function, in case they actually want
to have reliable randomness.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c  | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/random.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 2291e6224ed3..36cdb2406610 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -851,11 +851,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 }
 
-static inline void crng_wait_ready(void)
-{
-	wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
-}
-
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
 			  __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
@@ -1473,7 +1468,10 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
  * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
  * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
  * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch().
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
  */
 void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
@@ -1503,6 +1501,24 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
 /*
+ * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+ *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+ */
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+	if (likely(crng_ready()))
+		return 0;
+	return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+
+/*
  * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
  * pool is initialised.
  *
@@ -1856,6 +1872,8 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
 		unsigned int, flags)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1868,9 +1886,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
 	if (!crng_ready()) {
 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
 			return -EAGAIN;
-		crng_wait_ready();
-		if (signal_pending(current))
-			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
 	}
 	return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
 }
@@ -2031,7 +2049,10 @@ static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_
 /*
  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
  * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the
- * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy.
+ * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);
 u64 get_random_u64(void)
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index ed5c3838780d..e29929347c95 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
-- 
2.13.0

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-06 17:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-06 17:47 [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:52     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-06-08  0:00   ` [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:05   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:31   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:50     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  1:03       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:41   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:47     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  2:43   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58       ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17  0:41         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17  3:45           ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23             ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-17 18:50               ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-07-05  7:08               ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16                 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18  8:04             ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26  1:23               ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 17:38                 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30  6:02                   ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-07-05  7:03                   ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35                     ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  2:45   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:31     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:34     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  2:47   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  3:00   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  3:01   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  3:06   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  5:04     ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 12:03       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05         ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09  1:16             ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  8:19   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:01     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03     ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2017-06-15 11:59       ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 15:46         ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55           ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  8:43   ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld

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