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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 18:26:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607172627.GB8330@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1496854825.10825.24.camel@gmail.com>

On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 01:00:25PM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
> > On the better bootloaders, an initramfs segment can be loaded
> > independently (and you can have as many as required), which makes an
> > early_initramfs a more palatable vector to inject large amounts of
> > entropy into the next boot than, say, modifying the kernel image
> > directly at every boot/shutdown to stash entropy in there somewhere.

[...]
 
> I didn't really understand the device tree approach and mentioned a
> few times before. Passing via the kernel cmdline is a lot simpler than
> modifying the device tree in-memory and persistent modification isn't
> an option unless verified boot is missing anyway.

I might be missing something here, but the command line is inside of the
device tree, at /chosen/bootargs, so modifying the kernel command line
*is* modifying the device tree in-memory.

For arm64, we have a /chosen/kaslr-seed property that we hope
FW/bootloaders fill in, and similar could be done for some initial
entropy, provided appropriate HW/FW support.

Thanks,
Mark.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-07 17:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-06  0:50 [PATCH v3 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  5:11   ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-06 12:21     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 17:42   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 18:16     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:50 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  3:00   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06  3:56     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  4:44       ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 12:34         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 15:23           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:26             ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 17:30               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:03           ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:28             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:57             ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-06 18:01               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 22:19             ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-06 23:14               ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07  5:00               ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-07 14:42                 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-07 21:27                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 17:00               ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:26                 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2017-06-08  3:59                   ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:37             ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-08 12:02       ` Kevin Easton
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 10:08   ` David Howells
2017-06-06 12:23     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] iscsi: " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06  0:51 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld

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