public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kref: Avoid null pointer dereference after WARN
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2017 12:48:05 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170627194805.GK23705@tassilo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKR2os94662hRiECowoLp85A=_fDuMXOGq2U8R6ba4ywA@mail.gmail.com>

> Targeting things in /proc/sys via confused privileged helpers is
> extremely common. See Chrome OS pwn2own exploits (targetting modprobe
> sysctl), and plenty of others. Modern attack methodology is rarely a

Ok.

> single-bug attack, but rather a chain of bugs, which may include
> producing or exploiting weak userspace configurations to soften the
> kernel.
> 
> Regardless, it's a fair point that checking this unconditionally is
> wasteful. Strangely this doesn't help:

I doubt the runtime overhead is significant. The main issue I would
see is that kernels crash more often.

But if the issue doesn't really happens that often it 
probably doesn't matter (apart from kernel size, which
has been resolved)

Too bad we don't have kerneloops.org data left, so it's hard
to check data on this.

However I still think you would get more leverage out of generic
bug/panic_on_warn sysctls

-Andi

  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-27 19:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-27 19:00 [PATCH v2] kref: Avoid null pointer dereference after WARN Kees Cook
2017-06-27 19:15 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-27 19:22 ` Andi Kleen
2017-06-27 19:26   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-27 19:34     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 19:48       ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2017-06-27 20:16       ` Daniel Micay

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170627194805.GK23705@tassilo.jf.intel.com \
    --to=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=danielmicay@gmail.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=thellstrom@vmware.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox