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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 22:22:05 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170719032205.GA23598@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500416736-49829-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 03:25:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> This series has grown... :P
> 
> As discussed with Linus and Andy, we need to reset the stack rlimit
> before we do memory layouts when execing a privilege-gaining (e.g.
> setuid) program. To do this, we need to know the results of the
> bprm_secureexec hook before memory layouts. As it turns out, this
> can be made _mostly_ trivial by collapsing bprm_secureexec into
> bprm_set_creds.
> 
> The LSMs using bprm_secureexec nearly always save state between
> bprm_set_creds and bprm_secureexec. In the face of multiple calls to
> bprm_set_creds (via prepare_binprm() calls from binfmt_script, etc),
> all LSMs except commoncap only pay attention to the first call, so
> that aligns well with collapsing bprm_secureexec into bprm_set_creds.
> The commoncaps, though, needs to check the _last_ bprm_set_creds, so
> this series just swaps one bprm flag for another (cap_effective is no
> longer needed to save state between bprm_set_creds and bprm_secureexec,
> but we do need to keep a separate state, so we add the cap_elevated flag).
> 
> Once secureexec is available to setup_new_exec() before the memory
> layout, we can add an rlimit sanity-check for setuid execs. (With no
> need to clean up since we're past the point of no return.)
> 
> Along the way, this fixes comments, renames a variable, and consolidates
> dumpability and pdeath_signal clearing, which includes some commit log
> archeology to examine the subtle differences between what we had and
> what we need.
> 
> I'd appreciate some extra eyes on this to make sure this isn't broken
> in some special way. Looking at the diffstat, even after all my long
> comments, this is a net reduction in lines. :)
> 
> Given this crosses a bunch of areas, I think this is likely best to
> go via the -mm tree, which is where nearly all of my prior exec work
> has lived too.
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> -Kees
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Kees Cook (15):
>       binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag
>       exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
>       apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
>       selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
>       smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
>       commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
>       commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds
>       LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook
>       exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
>       exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability
>       exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal
>       smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing
>       exec: Consolidate dumpability logic
>       exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
>       exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing

Thanks, the set looks good to me,

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

Have you had a chance to run the ltp caps tests against this?

-serge

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-19  3:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-18 22:25 [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 01/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:05   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  1:01   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 02/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:08   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  1:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  4:40     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-19  9:19   ` James Morris
2017-07-19 23:56   ` Paul Moore
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:00   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  9:21   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 04/15] selinux: " Kees Cook
2017-07-20  0:03   ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20  0:19     ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20  1:37       ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20 13:42         ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20 17:06           ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20 20:42             ` Paul Moore
2017-07-21 15:40               ` Paul Moore
2017-07-21 17:37                 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-21 19:16                   ` Paul Moore
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 05/15] smack: " Kees Cook
2017-07-26  3:58   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-26 15:24     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 06/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook
2017-07-19  1:10   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  4:41     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20  4:53     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-31 22:43       ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01 13:12         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  9:26   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 07/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-19  1:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  9:28   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 08/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:02   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  9:29   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 09/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:45   ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-07-26  3:59   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-19  9:42   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-18 23:03 ` [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Linus Torvalds
2017-07-19  3:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2017-07-19  5:23   ` Kees Cook

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