From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
Shailesh Pandey <p.shailesh@samsung.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] ipc/shm: Add missing container_of() for randstruct
Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2017 13:35:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170730203528.GA54908@beast> (raw)
When building with the randstruct gcc plugin, the layout of the shm struct
will be randomized, which requires any sub-structure accesses to use
container_of(). One was still missing in the proc display handler, which
would lead to crashes when running the "lsipc" program after the system
had shm registers (e.g. after starting up Gnome):
[ 183.018415] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
[ 183.018692] RIP: 0010:shm_add_rss_swap.isra.1+0x13/0xa0
...
[ 183.019265] Call Trace:
[ 183.019294] sysvipc_shm_proc_show+0x5e/0x150
[ 183.019338] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[ 183.019376] ? sysvipc_find_ipc+0xbc/0xf0
[ 183.019416] sysvipc_proc_show+0x1a/0x30
[ 183.019456] seq_read+0x2e9/0x3f0
...
Reported-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Fixes: 3859a271a003 ("randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Hi Andrew, please take this as a fix for v4.13.
---
ipc/shm.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 28a444861a8f..8828b4c3a190 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1380,9 +1380,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(shmdt, char __user *, shmaddr)
static int sysvipc_shm_proc_show(struct seq_file *s, void *it)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(s);
- struct shmid_kernel *shp = it;
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp = it;
+ struct shmid_kernel *shp;
unsigned long rss = 0, swp = 0;
+ shp = container_of(ipcp, struct shmid_kernel, shm_perm);
shm_add_rss_swap(shp, &rss, &swp);
#if BITS_PER_LONG <= 32
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
reply other threads:[~2017-07-30 20:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20170730203528.GA54908@beast \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=dave@stgolabs.net \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux@dominikbrodowski.net \
--cc=manfred@colorfullife.com \
--cc=mszeredi@redhat.com \
--cc=p.shailesh@samsung.com \
--cc=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox