public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 16/20] Sanitize move_pages() permission checks
Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 12:09:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170822190916.014903591@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170822190915.345029476@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 197e7e521384a23b9e585178f3f11c9fa08274b9 upstream.

The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).

That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.

So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.

This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.

Famous last words.

Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/migrate.c |   13 ++++---------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/balloon_compaction.h>
 #include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
 #include <linux/page_idle.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 
@@ -1483,7 +1484,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid,
 		const int __user *, nodes,
 		int __user *, status, int, flags)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
 	int err;
@@ -1507,14 +1507,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid,
 
 	/*
 	 * Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
-	 * process. The right exists if the process has administrative
-	 * capabilities, superuser privileges or the same
-	 * userid as the target process.
-	 */
-	tcred = __task_cred(task);
-	if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
-	    !uid_eq(cred->uid,  tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->uid,  tcred->uid) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+	 * process. Use the regular "ptrace_may_access()" checks.
+	 */
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		err = -EPERM;
 		goto out;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-08-22 19:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-08-22 19:09 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.84-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/20] netfilter: nf_ct_ext: fix possible panic after nf_ct_extend_unregister Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/20] audit: Fix use after free in audit_remove_watch_rule() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/20] parisc: pci memory bar assignment fails with 64bit kernels on dino/cujo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/20] crypto: x86/sha1 - Fix reads beyond the number of blocks passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/20] Input: elan_i2c - add ELAN0608 to the ACPI table Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/20] Input: elan_i2c - Add antoher Lenovo ACPI ID for upcoming Lenovo NB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/20] ALSA: seq: 2nd attempt at fixing race creating a queue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/20] ALSA: usb-audio: Apply sample rate quirk to Sennheiser headset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/20] ALSA: usb-audio: Add mute TLV for playback volumes on C-Media devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/20] mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/20] mm: revert x86_64 and arm64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE base changes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/20] x86/asm/64: Clear AC on NMI entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/20] irqchip/atmel-aic: Fix unbalanced of_node_put() in aic_common_irq_fixup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/20] irqchip/atmel-aic: Fix unbalanced refcount in aic_common_rtc_irq_fixup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-08-22 19:10 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/20] pids: make task_tgid_nr_ns() safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:10 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/20] perf/x86: Fix LBR related crashes on Intel Atom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:10 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/20] usb: optimize acpi companion search for usb port devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-22 19:10 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/20] usb: qmi_wwan: add D-Link DWM-222 device ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-23  0:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.84-stable review Shuah Khan
2017-08-27 16:57 ` Guenter Roeck

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170822190916.014903591@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=otto.ebeling@iki.fi \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=w@1wt.eu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox