From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, xemul@virtuozzo.com
Subject: [PATCH] proc: fix /proc/*/map_files lookup
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:27:06 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171120212706.GA14325@avx2> (raw)
Current code does:
if (sscanf(dentry->d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)
However sscanf() is broken garbage.
It silently accepts whitespace between format specifiers
(did you know that?).
It silently accepts valid strings which result in integer overflow.
Do not use sscanf() for any even remotely reliable parsing code.
OK
# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
/lib/systemd/systemd
broken
# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/ 55a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
/lib/systemd/systemd
broken
# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/55a23af39000-55a23b05b000 '
/lib/systemd/systemd
very broken
# readlink '/proc/1/map_files/1000000000000000055a23af39000-55a23b05b000'
/lib/systemd/systemd
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
---
fs/proc/base.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@
#include "internal.h"
#include "fd.h"
+#include "../../lib/kstrtox.h"
+
/* NOTE:
* Implementing inode permission operations in /proc is almost
* certainly an error. Permission checks need to happen during
@@ -1907,8 +1909,33 @@ bool proc_fill_cache(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
static int dname_to_vma_addr(struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
{
- if (sscanf(dentry->d_name.name, "%lx-%lx", start, end) != 2)
+ const char *str = dentry->d_name.name;
+ unsigned long long sval, eval;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ len = _parse_integer(str, 16, &sval);
+ if (len & KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (sval != (unsigned long)sval)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ str += len;
+
+ if (*str != '-')
return -EINVAL;
+ str++;
+
+ len = _parse_integer(str, 16, &eval);
+ if (len & KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (eval != (unsigned long)eval)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ str += len;
+
+ if (*str != '\0')
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *start = sval;
+ *end = eval;
return 0;
}
next reply other threads:[~2017-11-20 21:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-20 21:27 Alexey Dobriyan [this message]
2017-11-20 22:16 ` [PATCH] proc: fix /proc/*/map_files lookup Andrew Morton
2017-11-21 5:48 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2017-11-28 5:29 ` Andrei Vagin
2017-11-28 10:12 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2017-11-29 22:56 ` Andrew Morton
2017-11-29 23:23 ` Andrei Vagin
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