From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 13/43] x86/entry/64: Use a percpu trampoline stack for IDT entries
Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2017 10:14:18 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171124091448.7649-14-mingo@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171124091448.7649-1-mingo@kernel.org>
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly
to the running task's kernel stack. Rearrange it so that we enter on
a percpu trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack.
This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance
to run some code before we touch the kernel stack.
The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring
it can wait.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fa3958723a1a85baeaf309c735b775841205800e.1511497875.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 5 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 18 +++++------
6 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index f81d50d7ceac..7d47199f405f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -563,6 +563,13 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
/* 0(%rsp): ~(interrupt number) */
.macro interrupt func
cld
+
+ testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
+ jz 1f
+ SWAPGS
+ call switch_to_thread_stack
+1:
+
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
SAVE_C_REGS
SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
@@ -572,12 +579,8 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
jz 1f
/*
- * IRQ from user mode. Switch to kernel gsbase and inform context
- * tracking that we're in kernel mode.
- */
- SWAPGS
-
- /*
+ * IRQ from user mode.
+ *
* We need to tell lockdep that IRQs are off. We can't do this until
* we fix gsbase, and we should do it before enter_from_user_mode
* (which can take locks). Since TRACE_IRQS_OFF idempotent,
@@ -831,6 +834,32 @@ apicinterrupt IRQ_WORK_VECTOR irq_work_interrupt smp_irq_work_interrupt
*/
#define CPU_TSS_IST(x) PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss) + (TSS_ist + ((x) - 1) * 8)
+/*
+ * Switch to the thread stack. This is called with the IRET frame and
+ * orig_ax on the stack. (That is, RDI..R12 are not on the stack and
+ * space has not been allocated for them.)
+ */
+ENTRY(switch_to_thread_stack)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+
+ pushq %rdi
+ movq %rsp, %rdi
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+ UNWIND_HINT sp_offset=16 sp_reg=ORC_REG_DI
+
+ pushq 7*8(%rdi) /* regs->ss */
+ pushq 6*8(%rdi) /* regs->rsp */
+ pushq 5*8(%rdi) /* regs->eflags */
+ pushq 4*8(%rdi) /* regs->cs */
+ pushq 3*8(%rdi) /* regs->ip */
+ pushq 2*8(%rdi) /* regs->orig_ax */
+ pushq 8(%rdi) /* return address */
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+
+ movq (%rdi), %rdi
+ ret
+END(switch_to_thread_stack)
+
.macro idtentry sym do_sym has_error_code:req paranoid=0 shift_ist=-1
ENTRY(\sym)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=\has_error_code*8
@@ -848,11 +877,12 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
- .if \paranoid
- .if \paranoid == 1
+ .if \paranoid < 2
testb $3, CS(%rsp) /* If coming from userspace, switch stacks */
- jnz 1f
+ jnz .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@
.endif
+
+ .if \paranoid
call paranoid_entry
.else
call error_entry
@@ -894,20 +924,15 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
jmp error_exit
.endif
- .if \paranoid == 1
+ .if \paranoid < 2
/*
- * Paranoid entry from userspace. Switch stacks and treat it
+ * Entry from userspace. Switch stacks and treat it
* as a normal entry. This means that paranoid handlers
* run in real process context if user_mode(regs).
*/
-1:
+.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
call error_entry
-
- movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
- call sync_regs
- movq %rax, %rsp /* switch stack */
-
movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
.if \has_error_code
@@ -1170,6 +1195,14 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
SWAPGS
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
+ /* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
+ popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
+ call sync_regs
+ movq %rax, %rsp /* switch stack */
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+ pushq %r12
+
/*
* We need to tell lockdep that IRQs are off. We can't do this until
* we fix gsbase, and we should do it before enter_from_user_mode
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index dcc6987f9bae..95ad40eb7eff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -306,8 +306,11 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
*/
movl %eax, %eax
- /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack (iret frame is already on stack) */
pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
+
+ /* switch to thread stack expects orig_ax to be pushed */
+ call switch_to_thread_stack
+
pushq %rdi /* pt_regs->di */
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
index 8c6bd6863db9..a6796ac8d311 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static inline void update_sp0(struct task_struct *task)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
load_sp0(task->thread.sp0);
#else
- load_sp0(task_top_of_stack(task));
+ /* On x86_64, sp0 always points to the entry trampoline stack. */
#endif
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 1fadd310ff68..31051f35cbb7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ dotraplinkage void do_segment_not_present(struct pt_regs *, long);
dotraplinkage void do_stack_segment(struct pt_regs *, long);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *, long);
-asmlinkage struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *);
#endif
dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);
dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c67742df569a..7c82a8a8bfda 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1645,11 +1645,13 @@ void cpu_init(void)
setup_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
/*
- * Initialize the TSS. Don't bother initializing sp0, as the initial
- * task never enters user mode.
+ * Initialize the TSS. sp0 points to the entry trampoline stack
+ * regardless of what task is running.
*/
set_tss_desc(cpu, &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
load_TR_desc();
+ load_sp0((unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss +
+ offsetofend(struct tss_struct, SYSENTER_stack));
load_mm_ldt(&init_mm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 1bd43f044c62..cbc4272bb9dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -359,8 +359,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
regs->cs == __KERNEL_CS &&
regs->ip == (unsigned long)native_irq_return_iret)
{
- struct pt_regs *normal_regs =
- (struct pt_regs *)this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
+ struct pt_regs *normal_regs = (struct pt_regs *)this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
/* Fake a #GP(0) from userspace. */
memmove(&normal_regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp, 5*8);
@@ -611,9 +610,10 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_int3);
* interrupted code was in user mode. The actual stack switch is done in
* entry_64.S
*/
-asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs)
+asmlinkage __visible notrace
+struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs)
{
- struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *)this_cpu_read(cpu_current_top_of_stack) - 1;
*regs = *eregs;
return regs;
}
@@ -630,13 +630,13 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s)
/*
* This is called from entry_64.S early in handling a fault
* caused by a bad iret to user mode. To handle the fault
- * correctly, we want move our stack frame to task_pt_regs
- * and we want to pretend that the exception came from the
- * iret target.
+ * correctly, we want move our stack frame to where it would
+ * be had we entered directly on the entry stack (rather than
+ * just below the IRET frame) and we want to pretend that the
+ * exception came from the iret target.
*/
struct bad_iret_stack *new_stack =
- container_of(task_pt_regs(current),
- struct bad_iret_stack, regs);
+ (struct bad_iret_stack *)this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
/* Copy the IRET target to the new stack. */
memmove(&new_stack->regs.ip, (void *)s->regs.sp, 5*8);
--
2.14.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-24 9:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-24 9:14 [PATCH 00/43] x86 entry-stack and Kaiser series, 2017/11/24 version Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 01/43] x86/decoder: Add new TEST instruction pattern Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 10:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-02 7:39 ` Robert Elliott (Persistent Memory)
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 02/43] x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 03/43] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 04/43] x86/gdt: Put per-cpu GDT remaps in ascending order Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 05/43] x86/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 11:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 06/43] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 07/43] x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 08/43] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 09/43] x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 11:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 10/43] x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the cpu entry area Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 11/43] x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 14:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 12/43] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2017-11-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 13/43] x86/entry/64: Use a percpu trampoline stack for IDT entries Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 14/43] x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 13:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 15/43] x86/entry/64: Create a percpu SYSCALL entry trampoline Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 13:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 16/43] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 13:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 17/43] x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 14:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 18/43] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into cpu_entry_area Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 14:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 19/43] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 14:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 20/43] x86/entry: Clean up SYSENTER_stack code Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 14:24 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 21/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Disable global pages by default with KAISER Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 22/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Prepare assembly for entry/exit CR3 switching Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 12:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 12:17 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 12:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 23/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Introduce user-mapped per-cpu areas Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 24/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Mark per-cpu data structures required for entry/exit Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 25/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Unmap kernel from userspace page tables (core patch) Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 12:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 13:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 12:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 16:33 ` Dave Hansen
2017-11-26 15:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 13:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-26 15:15 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 8:59 ` [PATCH] x86/mm/kaiser: Use the other page_table_lock pattern Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-27 8:59 ` [PATCH] mm: Unify page_table_lock allocation pattern Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 26/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 27/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Make sure static PGDs are 8k in size Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 28/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Map CPU entry area Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 13:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 29/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Map dynamically-allocated LDTs Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 30/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Map espfix structures Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 13:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-27 9:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-27 15:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 31/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Map entry stack variable Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 32/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Map virtually-addressed performance monitoring buffers Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 33/43] x86/mm: Move CR3 construction functions Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 34/43] x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 35/43] x86/mm: Put mmu-to-h/w ASID translation in one place Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 36/43] x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 37/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Use PCID feature to make user and kernel switches faster Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 38/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Disable native VSYSCALL Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 39/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Add debugfs file to turn KAISER on/off at runtime Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 40/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Add a function to check for KAISER being enabled Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 41/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Un-poison PGDs at runtime Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 42/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Allow KAISER to be enabled/disabled " Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 9:14 ` [PATCH 43/43] x86/mm/kaiser: Add Kconfig Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 13:55 ` [PATCH 00/43] x86 entry-stack and Kaiser series, 2017/11/24 version Ingo Molnar
2017-11-24 15:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 17:19 ` Ingo Molnar
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