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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 01/21] x86/unwinder/orc: Don't bail on stack overflow
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 11:45:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171127104529.12435-2-mingo@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171127104529.12435-1-mingo@kernel.org>

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

If we overflow the stack into a guard page and then try to unwind it
with ORC, it should work well: by construction, there can't be any
meaningful data in the guard page because no writes to the guard page
will have succeeded.

This patch fixes a bug that unwinding from working correctly: if the
starting register state has RSP pointing into a stack guard page, the
ORC unwinder bails out immediately.  This patch fixes that: the ORC
unwinder will start the unwind.

I tested this by intentionally overflowing the task stack.  The
result is an accurate call trace instead of a trace consisting
purely of '?' entries.

There are a few other bugs that are triggered if the unwinder
encounters a stack overflow after the first step, and Josh has WIP
patches to fix those as well.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/927042950d7f1a7007dd0f58538966a593508f8b.1511715954.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index a3f973b2c97a..7f6e3935666b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -553,8 +553,18 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task,
 	}
 
 	if (get_stack_info((unsigned long *)state->sp, state->task,
-			   &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask))
-		return;
+			   &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask)) {
+		/*
+		 * We weren't on a valid stack.  It's possible that
+		 * we overflowed a valid stack into a guard page.
+		 * See if the next page up is valid so that we can
+		 * generate some kind of backtrace if this happens.
+		 */
+		void *next_page = (void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)regs->sp);
+		if (get_stack_info(next_page, state->task, &state->stack_info,
+				   &state->stack_mask))
+			return;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * The caller can provide the address of the first frame directly
-- 
2.14.1

  reply	other threads:[~2017-11-27 11:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-11-27 10:45 [PATCH 00/21] Preparatory patches for x86 KAISER support Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2017-11-27 14:47   ` [PATCH 01/21] x86/unwinder/orc: Don't bail on stack overflow Borislav Petkov
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 02/21] x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 17:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-28  4:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 03/21] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 04/21] x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 05/21] x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 06/21] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 07/21] x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 08/21] x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce 'struct cpu_entry_area' Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 09/21] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 10/21] x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 11/21] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 19:26   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28  4:29     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-11-28  5:29       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-28 18:15         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 12/21] x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 13/21] x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 14/21] x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 15/21] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 16/21] x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries Ingo Molnar
2017-12-01 17:06   ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-01 17:44     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-01 21:21       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-01 21:59         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-02  6:41         ` Kevin Easton
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 17/21] x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 18/21] x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 19/21] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into 'struct cpu_entry_area' Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 20/21] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Ingo Molnar
2017-11-27 10:45 ` [PATCH 21/21] x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code Ingo Molnar
2017-12-01 17:59   ` Borislav Petkov

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