Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

On Fri, Dec 01, 2017 at 09:54:43AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 1 December 2017 at 09:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 05:18:42PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On 30 November 2017 at 17:10, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> >> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> > On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 04:32:35PM +0000, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >> >> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 01:36:25PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >> >> > On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 1:14 PM, Linus Torvalds
> >> >> > <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >> >> > >
> >> >> > > Not because %pK itself changed, but because the semantics of %p did.
> >> >> > > The baseline moved, and the "safe" version did not.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Btw, that baseline for me is now that I can do
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   ./scripts/leaking_addresses.pl | wc -l
> >> >> >   18
> >> >> >
> >> >> > and of those 18 hits, six are false positives (looks like bitmaps in
> >> >> > the uevent keys).
> >> >> >
> >> >> > The remaining 12 are from the EFI runtime map files
> >> >> > (/sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/*). They should presumably not be
> >> >> > world-readable, but sadly the kset_create_and_add() helper seems to do
> >> >> > that by default.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > I think the sysfs code makes it insanely too easy to make things
> >> >> > world-readable. You try to be careful, and mark things read-only etc,
> >> >> > but __ATTR_RO() jkust means S_IRUGO, which means world-readable.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > There seems to be no convenient model for kobjects having better
> >> >> > permissions. Greg?
> >> >>
> >> >> They can just use __ATTR() which lets you set the exact mode settings
> >> >> that are wanted.
> >> >>
> >> >> Something like the patch below, which breaks the build as the
> >> >> map_attributes are "odd", but you get the idea.  The EFI developers can
> >> >> fix this up properly :)
> >> >>
> >> >> Note, this only accounts for 5 attributes, what is the whole list?
> >> >
> >> > Ah, it's the virt_addr file 12 times, I just ran it on my laptop:
> >> >
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/7/virt_addr: 0xfffffffeea6ea000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/5/virt_addr: 0xfffffffeee88b000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/3/virt_addr: 0xfffffffefea00000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/11/virt_addr: 0xfffffffed9c00000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/1/virt_addr: 0xfffffffefee00000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/8/virt_addr: 0xfffffffedba4e000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/6/virt_addr: 0xfffffffeee2de000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/4/virt_addr: 0xfffffffeeea00000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/2/virt_addr: 0xfffffffefec00000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/10/virt_addr: 0xfffffffed9c60000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/0/virt_addr: 0xfffffffeff000000
> >> > /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map/9/virt_addr: 0xfffffffedb9c9000
> >> >
> >> > So changing it to use __ATTR() should fix this remaning leakage up.
> >> > That is if we even really need to export these values at all.  What does
> >> > userspace do with them?  Shouldn't they just be in debugfs instead?
> >> >
> >>
> >> These are the virtual mappings UEFI firmware regions, which must
> >> remain in the same place across kexec reboots. So kexec tooling
> >> consumes this information and passes it on to the incoming kernel in
> >> some way.
> >>
> >> Note that these are not kernel addresses, so while I agree they should
> >> not be world readable, they won't give you any clue as to where the
> >> kernel itself is mapped.
> >>
> >> So the recommendation is to switch to __ATTR( ... 0400 ... ) instead?
> >> If so, I'll code up a patch.
> >
> > If these pointers are not "real", I recommend just leaving them as-is.
> 
> That's not what I said :-)
> 
> These are real pointers, and stuff will actually be mapped there
> (although I am not intimately familiar with the way x86 does this, but
> on ARM [which does not have these sysfs nodes in the first place],
> these mappings are only live during the time a UEFI runtime service
> call is in progress, and IIRC, work was underway to do the same for
> x86). So while these values don't correlate with the placement of
> kernel data structures, they could still be useful for an attacker to
> figure out where exploitable firmware memory regions are located,
> especially given that some of these may be mapped RWX.

Ah, ok, then yes, make that file readable from root only.

And isn't there a specific %p modifier you should use for a kernel
pointer.  I've lost the thread here for what should, or should not, be
done for kernel pointers these days based on the long email discussion.

thanks,

greg k-h