From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: [patch 03/60] x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2017 15:07:09 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171204150605.071425003@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20171204140706.296109558@linutronix.de
[-- Attachment #1: x86-unwinder--Handle_stack_overflows_more_gracefully.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 9443 bytes --]
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
There are at least two unwinder bugs hindering the debugging of
stack-overflow crashes:
- It doesn't deal gracefully with the case where the stack overflows and
the stack pointer itself isn't on a valid stack but the
to-be-dereferenced data *is*.
- The ORC oops dump code doesn't know how to print partial pt_regs, for the
case where if we get an interrupt/exception in *early* entry code
before the full pt_regs have been saved.
Fix both issues.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171126024031.uxi4numpbjm5rlbr@treble
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 7 +++
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 32 ++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 11 ++----
arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 76 ++++++++++++++----------------------------
5 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ extern void die(const char *, struct pt_
extern int __must_check __die(const char *, struct pt_regs *, long);
extern void show_stack_regs(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, int all);
+extern void show_iret_regs(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern unsigned long oops_begin(void);
extern void oops_end(unsigned long, struct pt_regs *, int signr);
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
+#define IRET_FRAME_OFFSET (offsetof(struct pt_regs, ip))
+#define IRET_FRAME_SIZE (sizeof(struct pt_regs) - IRET_FRAME_OFFSET)
+
struct unwind_state {
struct stack_info stack_info;
unsigned long stack_mask;
@@ -52,6 +55,10 @@ void unwind_start(struct unwind_state *s
}
#if defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) || defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)
+/*
+ * WARNING: The entire pt_regs may not be safe to dereference. In some cases,
+ * only the iret frame registers are accessible. Use with caution!
+ */
static inline struct pt_regs *unwind_get_entry_regs(struct unwind_state *state)
{
if (unwind_done(state))
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -50,6 +50,28 @@ static void printk_stack_address(unsigne
printk("%s %s%pB\n", log_lvl, reliable ? "" : "? ", (void *)address);
}
+void show_iret_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ printk(KERN_DEFAULT "RIP: %04x:%pS\n", (int)regs->cs, (void *)regs->ip);
+ printk(KERN_DEFAULT "RSP: %04x:%016lx EFLAGS: %08lx", (int)regs->ss,
+ regs->sp, regs->flags);
+}
+
+static void show_regs_safe(struct stack_info *info, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (on_stack(info, regs, sizeof(*regs)))
+ __show_regs(regs, 0);
+ else if (on_stack(info, (void *)regs + IRET_FRAME_OFFSET,
+ IRET_FRAME_SIZE)) {
+ /*
+ * When an interrupt or exception occurs in entry code, the
+ * full pt_regs might not have been saved yet. In that case
+ * just print the iret frame.
+ */
+ show_iret_regs(regs);
+ }
+}
+
void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long *stack, char *log_lvl)
{
@@ -94,8 +116,8 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_stru
if (stack_name)
printk("%s <%s>\n", log_lvl, stack_name);
- if (regs && on_stack(&stack_info, regs, sizeof(*regs)))
- __show_regs(regs, 0);
+ if (regs)
+ show_regs_safe(&stack_info, regs);
/*
* Scan the stack, printing any text addresses we find. At the
@@ -119,7 +141,7 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_stru
/*
* Don't print regs->ip again if it was already printed
- * by __show_regs() below.
+ * by show_regs_safe() below.
*/
if (regs && stack == ®s->ip)
goto next;
@@ -155,8 +177,8 @@ void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_stru
/* if the frame has entry regs, print them */
regs = unwind_get_entry_regs(&state);
- if (regs && on_stack(&stack_info, regs, sizeof(*regs)))
- __show_regs(regs, 0);
+ if (regs)
+ show_regs_safe(&stack_info, regs);
}
if (stack_name)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -69,9 +69,8 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, i
unsigned int fsindex, gsindex;
unsigned int ds, cs, es;
- printk(KERN_DEFAULT "RIP: %04lx:%pS\n", regs->cs, (void *)regs->ip);
- printk(KERN_DEFAULT "RSP: %04lx:%016lx EFLAGS: %08lx", regs->ss,
- regs->sp, regs->flags);
+ show_iret_regs(regs);
+
if (regs->orig_ax != -1)
pr_cont(" ORIG_RAX: %016lx\n", regs->orig_ax);
else
@@ -88,6 +87,9 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, i
printk(KERN_DEFAULT "R13: %016lx R14: %016lx R15: %016lx\n",
regs->r13, regs->r14, regs->r15);
+ if (!all)
+ return;
+
asm("movl %%ds,%0" : "=r" (ds));
asm("movl %%cs,%0" : "=r" (cs));
asm("movl %%es,%0" : "=r" (es));
@@ -98,9 +100,6 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, i
rdmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, gs);
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, shadowgs);
- if (!all)
- return;
-
cr0 = read_cr0();
cr2 = read_cr2();
cr3 = __read_cr3();
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -253,22 +253,15 @@ unsigned long *unwind_get_return_address
return NULL;
}
-static bool stack_access_ok(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr,
+static bool stack_access_ok(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long _addr,
size_t len)
{
struct stack_info *info = &state->stack_info;
+ void *addr = (void *)_addr;
- /*
- * If the address isn't on the current stack, switch to the next one.
- *
- * We may have to traverse multiple stacks to deal with the possibility
- * that info->next_sp could point to an empty stack and the address
- * could be on a subsequent stack.
- */
- while (!on_stack(info, (void *)addr, len))
- if (get_stack_info(info->next_sp, state->task, info,
- &state->stack_mask))
- return false;
+ if (!on_stack(info, addr, len) &&
+ (get_stack_info(addr, state->task, info, &state->stack_mask)))
+ return false;
return true;
}
@@ -283,42 +276,32 @@ static bool deref_stack_reg(struct unwin
return true;
}
-#define REGS_SIZE (sizeof(struct pt_regs))
-#define SP_OFFSET (offsetof(struct pt_regs, sp))
-#define IRET_REGS_SIZE (REGS_SIZE - offsetof(struct pt_regs, ip))
-#define IRET_SP_OFFSET (SP_OFFSET - offsetof(struct pt_regs, ip))
-
static bool deref_stack_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long *ip, unsigned long *sp, bool full)
+ unsigned long *ip, unsigned long *sp)
{
- size_t regs_size = full ? REGS_SIZE : IRET_REGS_SIZE;
- size_t sp_offset = full ? SP_OFFSET : IRET_SP_OFFSET;
- struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *)(addr + regs_size - REGS_SIZE);
-
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
- if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, regs_size))
- return false;
-
- *ip = regs->ip;
- *sp = regs->sp;
+ struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *)addr;
- return true;
- }
+ /* x86-32 support will be more complicated due to the ®s->sp hack */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32));
- if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, sp_offset))
+ if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, sizeof(struct pt_regs)))
return false;
*ip = regs->ip;
+ *sp = regs->sp;
+ return true;
+}
- if (user_mode(regs)) {
- if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr + sp_offset,
- REGS_SIZE - SP_OFFSET))
- return false;
-
- *sp = regs->sp;
- } else
- *sp = (unsigned long)®s->sp;
+static bool deref_stack_iret_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long *ip, unsigned long *sp)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = (void *)addr - IRET_FRAME_OFFSET;
+ if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, IRET_FRAME_SIZE))
+ return false;
+
+ *ip = regs->ip;
+ *sp = regs->sp;
return true;
}
@@ -327,7 +310,6 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_sta
unsigned long ip_p, sp, orig_ip, prev_sp = state->sp;
enum stack_type prev_type = state->stack_info.type;
struct orc_entry *orc;
- struct pt_regs *ptregs;
bool indirect = false;
if (unwind_done(state))
@@ -435,7 +417,7 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_sta
break;
case ORC_TYPE_REGS:
- if (!deref_stack_regs(state, sp, &state->ip, &state->sp, true)) {
+ if (!deref_stack_regs(state, sp, &state->ip, &state->sp)) {
orc_warn("can't dereference registers at %p for ip %pB\n",
(void *)sp, (void *)orig_ip);
goto done;
@@ -447,20 +429,14 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_sta
break;
case ORC_TYPE_REGS_IRET:
- if (!deref_stack_regs(state, sp, &state->ip, &state->sp, false)) {
+ if (!deref_stack_iret_regs(state, sp, &state->ip, &state->sp)) {
orc_warn("can't dereference iret registers at %p for ip %pB\n",
(void *)sp, (void *)orig_ip);
goto done;
}
- ptregs = container_of((void *)sp, struct pt_regs, ip);
- if ((unsigned long)ptregs >= prev_sp &&
- on_stack(&state->stack_info, ptregs, REGS_SIZE)) {
- state->regs = ptregs;
- state->full_regs = false;
- } else
- state->regs = NULL;
-
+ state->regs = (void *)sp - IRET_FRAME_OFFSET;
+ state->full_regs = false;
state->signal = true;
break;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-04 17:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-04 14:07 [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 01/60] x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:17 ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 02/60] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 21:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 04/60] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 05/60] x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 06/60] x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 07/60] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 08/60] x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 09/60] x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 10/60] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 11/60] x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 12/60] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 13/60] x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 14/60] x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 15/60] x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 16/60] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 17/60] x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 18/60] x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 19/60] x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 20/60] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 21/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 22/60] x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 19:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 23/60] x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 24/60] x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:18 ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 25/60] x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:19 ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 26/60] x86/cpufeature: Make cpu bugs sticky Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 27/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 23:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 28/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable global pages if KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 14:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 29/60] x86/mm/kpti: Prepare the x86/entry assembly code for entry/exit CR3 switching Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 30/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 15:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 31/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add mapping helper functions Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-07 8:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 32/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 17:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 33/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allocate a separate user PGD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 18:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-06 20:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 34/60] x86/mm/kpti: Populate " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 19:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 35/60] x86/espfix: Ensure that ESPFIX is visible in " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 36/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 15:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 37/60] x86mm//kpti: Force entry through trampoline when KPTI active Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 38/60] x86/fixmap: Move cpu entry area into a separate PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 18:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 39/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share cpu_entry_area PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 21:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 40/60] x86: PMD align entry text Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07 8:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 41/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share entry text PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07 8:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 42/60] x86/fixmap: Move IDT fixmap into the cpu_entry_area range Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 43/60] x86/fixmap: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07 9:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 44/60] x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 45/60] x86/fixmap: Add ldt entries to user shared fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 46/60] x86/ldt: Rename ldt_struct->entries member Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 47/60] x86/ldt: Map LDT entries into fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 48/60] x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 49/60] x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 50/60] x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 51/60] x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:34 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 22:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 22:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 23:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 52/60] x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 53/60] x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 21:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 22:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 22:08 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 54/60] x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 55/60] x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single() Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 13:51 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 14:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 56/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable native VSYSCALL Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 57/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add Kconfig Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 16:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 16:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 9:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 58/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Add page table directory Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 59/60] x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 60/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:02 ` [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Linus Torvalds
2017-12-04 18:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:21 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-12-04 18:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-05 21:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 21:57 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-19 20:56 ` Andrew Morton
2018-01-19 21:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-20 19:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
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