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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [patch 17/60] x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2017 15:07:23 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171204150606.225330557@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20171204140706.296109558@linutronix.de

[-- Attachment #1: x86-entry-64--Use_a_per-CPU_trampoline_stack_for_IDT_entries.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 7743 bytes --]

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly
to the running task's kernel stack.  Rearrange it so that we enter on
a per-CPU trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack.
This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance
to run some code before we touch the kernel stack.

The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring
it can wait.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fa3958723a1a85baeaf309c735b775841205800e.1511497875.git.luto@kernel.org

---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S        |   67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S |    5 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h |    3 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h     |    1 
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c     |    6 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c          |   12 +++---
 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -564,6 +564,13 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
 /* 0(%rsp): ~(interrupt number) */
 	.macro interrupt func
 	cld
+
+	testb	$3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
+	jz	1f
+	SWAPGS
+	call	switch_to_thread_stack
+1:
+
 	ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
 	SAVE_C_REGS
 	SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
@@ -573,12 +580,8 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
 	jz	1f
 
 	/*
-	 * IRQ from user mode.  Switch to kernel gsbase and inform context
-	 * tracking that we're in kernel mode.
-	 */
-	SWAPGS
-
-	/*
+	 * IRQ from user mode.
+	 *
 	 * We need to tell lockdep that IRQs are off.  We can't do this until
 	 * we fix gsbase, and we should do it before enter_from_user_mode
 	 * (which can take locks).  Since TRACE_IRQS_OFF idempotent,
@@ -832,6 +835,32 @@ apicinterrupt IRQ_WORK_VECTOR			irq_work
  */
 #define CPU_TSS_IST(x) PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss) + (TSS_ist + ((x) - 1) * 8)
 
+/*
+ * Switch to the thread stack.  This is called with the IRET frame and
+ * orig_ax on the stack.  (That is, RDI..R12 are not on the stack and
+ * space has not been allocated for them.)
+ */
+ENTRY(switch_to_thread_stack)
+	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+
+	pushq	%rdi
+	movq	%rsp, %rdi
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
+	UNWIND_HINT sp_offset=16 sp_reg=ORC_REG_DI
+
+	pushq	7*8(%rdi)		/* regs->ss */
+	pushq	6*8(%rdi)		/* regs->rsp */
+	pushq	5*8(%rdi)		/* regs->eflags */
+	pushq	4*8(%rdi)		/* regs->cs */
+	pushq	3*8(%rdi)		/* regs->ip */
+	pushq	2*8(%rdi)		/* regs->orig_ax */
+	pushq	8(%rdi)			/* return address */
+	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+
+	movq	(%rdi), %rdi
+	ret
+END(switch_to_thread_stack)
+
 .macro idtentry sym do_sym has_error_code:req paranoid=0 shift_ist=-1
 ENTRY(\sym)
 	UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=\has_error_code*8
@@ -849,11 +878,12 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
 
 	ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
 
-	.if \paranoid
-	.if \paranoid == 1
+	.if \paranoid < 2
 	testb	$3, CS(%rsp)			/* If coming from userspace, switch stacks */
-	jnz	1f
+	jnz	.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@
 	.endif
+
+	.if \paranoid
 	call	paranoid_entry
 	.else
 	call	error_entry
@@ -895,20 +925,15 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
 	jmp	error_exit
 	.endif
 
-	.if \paranoid == 1
+	.if \paranoid < 2
 	/*
-	 * Paranoid entry from userspace.  Switch stacks and treat it
+	 * Entry from userspace.  Switch stacks and treat it
 	 * as a normal entry.  This means that paranoid handlers
 	 * run in real process context if user_mode(regs).
 	 */
-1:
+.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
 	call	error_entry
 
-
-	movq	%rsp, %rdi			/* pt_regs pointer */
-	call	sync_regs
-	movq	%rax, %rsp			/* switch stack */
-
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi			/* pt_regs pointer */
 
 	.if \has_error_code
@@ -1171,6 +1196,14 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	SWAPGS
 
 .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
+	/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
+	popq	%r12				/* save return addr in %12 */
+	movq	%rsp, %rdi			/* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
+	call	sync_regs
+	movq	%rax, %rsp			/* switch stack */
+	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+	pushq	%r12
+
 	/*
 	 * We need to tell lockdep that IRQs are off.  We can't do this until
 	 * we fix gsbase, and we should do it before enter_from_user_mode
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -306,8 +306,11 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 	 */
 	movl	%eax, %eax
 
-	/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack (iret frame is already on stack) */
 	pushq	%rax			/* pt_regs->orig_ax */
+
+	/* switch to thread stack expects orig_ax to be pushed */
+	call	switch_to_thread_stack
+
 	pushq	%rdi			/* pt_regs->di */
 	pushq	%rsi			/* pt_regs->si */
 	pushq	%rdx			/* pt_regs->dx */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
@@ -90,10 +90,9 @@ static inline void refresh_sysenter_cs(s
 /* This is used when switching tasks or entering/exiting vm86 mode. */
 static inline void update_sp0(struct task_struct *task)
 {
+	/* On x86_64, sp0 always points to the entry trampoline stack, which is constant: */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	load_sp0(task->thread.sp0);
-#else
-	load_sp0(task_top_of_stack(task));
 #endif
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ dotraplinkage void do_segment_not_presen
 dotraplinkage void do_stack_segment(struct pt_regs *, long);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *, long);
-asmlinkage struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *);
 #endif
 dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);
 dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1648,11 +1648,13 @@ void cpu_init(void)
 	setup_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
 
 	/*
-	 * Initialize the TSS.  Don't bother initializing sp0, as the initial
-	 * task never enters user mode.
+	 * Initialize the TSS.  sp0 points to the entry trampoline stack
+	 * regardless of what task is running.
 	 */
 	set_tss_desc(cpu, &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
 	load_TR_desc();
+	load_sp0((unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss +
+		 offsetofend(struct tss_struct, SYSENTER_stack));
 
 	load_mm_ldt(&init_mm);
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_int3);
  */
 asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs)
 {
-	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *)this_cpu_read(cpu_current_top_of_stack) - 1;
 	*regs = *eregs;
 	return regs;
 }
@@ -648,13 +648,13 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(st
 	/*
 	 * This is called from entry_64.S early in handling a fault
 	 * caused by a bad iret to user mode.  To handle the fault
-	 * correctly, we want move our stack frame to task_pt_regs
-	 * and we want to pretend that the exception came from the
-	 * iret target.
+	 * correctly, we want to move our stack frame to where it would
+	 * be had we entered directly on the entry stack (rather than
+	 * just below the IRET frame) and we want to pretend that the
+	 * exception came from the IRET target.
 	 */
 	struct bad_iret_stack *new_stack =
-		container_of(task_pt_regs(current),
-			     struct bad_iret_stack, regs);
+		(struct bad_iret_stack *)this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
 
 	/* Copy the IRET target to the new stack. */
 	memmove(&new_stack->regs.ip, (void *)s->regs.sp, 5*8);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-04 17:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-04 14:07 [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 01/60] x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:17   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 02/60] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:31   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 21:31     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 03/60] x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 04/60] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 05/60] x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 06/60] x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 07/60] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 08/60] x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 09/60] x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 10/60] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 11/60] x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 12/60] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 13/60] x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 14/60] x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 15/60] x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 16/60] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 18/60] x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 19/60] x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:30   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 20/60] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 21/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 22/60] x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 19:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 23/60] x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 24/60] x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:18   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 25/60] x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:19   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 26/60] x86/cpufeature: Make cpu bugs sticky Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 27/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 23:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 28/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable global pages if KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 14:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 29/60] x86/mm/kpti: Prepare the x86/entry assembly code for entry/exit CR3 switching Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 30/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 15:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 31/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add mapping helper functions Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-07  8:33     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 32/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 33/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allocate a separate user PGD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 18:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-06 20:56     ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 34/60] x86/mm/kpti: Populate " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 35/60] x86/espfix: Ensure that ESPFIX is visible in " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 36/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 15:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 37/60] x86mm//kpti: Force entry through trampoline when KPTI active Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 38/60] x86/fixmap: Move cpu entry area into a separate PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 18:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 39/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share cpu_entry_area PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 21:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 40/60] x86: PMD align entry text Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  8:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 41/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share entry text PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  8:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 42/60] x86/fixmap: Move IDT fixmap into the cpu_entry_area range Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 43/60] x86/fixmap: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  9:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 44/60] x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 45/60] x86/fixmap: Add ldt entries to user shared fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 46/60] x86/ldt: Rename ldt_struct->entries member Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 47/60] x86/ldt: Map LDT entries into fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 48/60] x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 49/60] x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 50/60] x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 51/60] x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:34     ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 22:36       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 22:54       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 23:06         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 52/60] x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 53/60] x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 21:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 22:05     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 22:08       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 54/60] x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 55/60] x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single() Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:25   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 13:51       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 14:08         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 56/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable native VSYSCALL Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 57/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add Kconfig Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 16:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 16:57     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05  9:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 58/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Add page table directory Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 59/60] x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 60/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:02 ` [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Linus Torvalds
2017-12-04 18:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:21     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-12-04 18:28     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-05 21:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 21:57   ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 23:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-19 20:56 ` Andrew Morton
2018-01-19 21:06   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-20 19:59   ` Thomas Gleixner

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