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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] usercopy: Remove pointer from overflow report
Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 12:37:42 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180102203742.GA27518@beast> (raw)

Using %p was already mostly useless in the usercopy overflow reports,
so this removes it entirely to avoid confusion now that %p-hashing
is enabled.

Fixes: ad67b74d2469d9b8 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
I have follow-ups to this that include the offset in reporting, but it's a
large enough refactoring that I don't think it should go into a late -rc like
this. I'll send it as part of the 4.16 merge window instead.
---
 mm/usercopy.c | 9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index a9852b24715d..5df1e68d4585 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -58,12 +58,11 @@ static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
 	return GOOD_STACK;
 }
 
-static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
-			    bool to_user, const char *type)
+static void report_usercopy(unsigned long len, bool to_user, const char *type)
 {
-	pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
+	pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s '%s' (%lu bytes)\n",
 		to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
-		to_user ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
+		to_user ? "from" : "to", type ? : "unknown", len);
 	/*
 	 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
 	 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
@@ -261,6 +260,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
 		return;
 
 report:
-	report_usercopy(ptr, n, to_user, err);
+	report_usercopy(n, to_user, err);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
-- 
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

                 reply	other threads:[~2018-01-02 20:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

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