From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 01:04:44 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180103070444.GA6331@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180102232133.GA39880@beast>
On Tue, Jan 02, 2018 at 03:21:33PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> This is a logical revert of:
>
> commit e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
>
> This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in
> current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not
> being tied to secureexec.
>
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
>
> Reported-by: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>
Seems right, any chance we could get a tested-by: Tom? (Did we already
get that?)
> Fixes: e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> fs/exec.c | 9 +++++++--
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 5688b5e1b937..7eb8d21bcab9 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1349,9 +1349,14 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>
> current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
>
> - /* Figure out dumpability. */
> + /*
> + * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
> + * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
> + * bprm->secureexec instead.
> + */
> if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
> - bprm->secureexec)
> + !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
> + gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
> set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
> else
> set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
> --
> 2.7.4
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-03 7:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-02 23:21 [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec Kees Cook
2018-01-03 7:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2018-01-03 12:11 ` Tom Horsley
2018-01-03 17:21 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-03 17:34 ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-03 7:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 17:21 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-03 17:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 19:08 ` Tom Horsley
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