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From: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 07:11:58 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180103071158.204eeb41@tomh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180103070444.GA6331@mail.hallyn.com>

On Wed, 3 Jan 2018 01:04:44 -0600
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> > This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in
> > current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not
> > being tied to secureexec.
> > 
> > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
> > 
> > Reported-by: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>  
> 
> Seems right, any chance we could get a tested-by: Tom?  (Did we already
> get that?)

I didn't test it myself, but all I'd do is run the test program
I've attached to the bugzilla above which is trivial compared
to be learning how to patch and build kernels. So it would be
much simpler for someone with the kernel already built to
extract the tarball and type make :-).

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-03 12:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-02 23:21 [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec Kees Cook
2018-01-03  7:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 12:11   ` Tom Horsley [this message]
2018-01-03 17:21     ` Kees Cook
2018-01-03 17:34       ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-03  7:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 17:21   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-03 17:41     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 19:08     ` Tom Horsley

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