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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
	tglx@linutronix.de,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 12:42:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180104114231.GB1702@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515054014.12987.75.camel@amazon.co.uk>

On Thu 2018-01-04 08:20:14, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 03:11 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > On 04/01/2018 02:59, Alan Cox wrote:
> > >> But then, exactly because the retpoline approach adds quite some cruft
> > >> and leaves something to be desired, why even bother?
> > >
> > > Performance
> > 
> > Dunno.  If I care about mitigating this threat, I wouldn't stop at
> > retpolines even if the full solution has pretty bad performance (it's
> > roughly in the same ballpark as PTI).  But if I don't care, I wouldn't
> > want retpolines either, since they do introduce a small slowdown (10-20
> > cycles per indirect branch, meaning that after a thousand such papercuts
> > they become slower than the full solution).
> > 
> > A couple manually written asm retpolines may be good as mitigation to
> > block the simplest PoCs (Linus may disagree), but patching the compiler,
> > getting alternatives right, etc. will take a while.  The only redeeming
> > grace of retpolines is that they don't require a microcode update, but
> > the microcode will be out there long before these patches are included
> > and trickle down to distros...  I just don't see the point in starting
> > from retpolines or drawing the line there.
> 
> No, really. The full mitigation with the microcode update and IBRS
> support is *slow*. Horribly slow.

What is IBRS? Invalidate BRanch prediction bufferS?

> By using retpoline, we avoid the need to set IBRS on *every* entry into
> the kernel. It gives you *most* of that performance back.
> 
> It's horrid, but it seems to be the best option we have. And in my
> original patch set, it goes away almost completely if it isn't being
> used. (Apart from the fact that your eyes may still bleed; I can't do
> anything about that. Sorry).

Bleeding eyes sound like quite serious side-effect :-).

								Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-04 11:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-03 23:09 Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/11] x86/retpoline: Define retpoline indirect thunk and macros Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/11] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/11] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert xen " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/11] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/11] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/11] x86/retpoline: Finally enable retpoline for C code Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:28   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04  8:30     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/11] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in compiler Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:35     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/11] retpoline/objtool: Disable some objtool warnings Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:51 ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:00   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:09   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:12     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:15       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:19         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05  2:01           ` james harvey
2018-01-05 10:40             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 12:29               ` james harvey
2018-01-05 12:06             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:29         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:31           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:38             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:40             ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:15               ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:53                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 15:55                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04  0:20       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:26         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:18     ` David Lang
2018-01-04  1:00   ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04  1:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  1:59     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  2:11       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  8:20         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:42           ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2018-01-04 11:47             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:20               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 14:51                 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 15:29                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:32                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 15:37                       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 16:15                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 20:00                       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 20:05                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 23:47                           ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-05  0:06                             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05  0:26                             ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 16:52                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 15:32                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 16:25                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:04                       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 17:40                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:13                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 17:15                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 18:05                           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 14:55                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 18:24                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 19:57           ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:41             ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:54               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  4:11                 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  9:59                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:28                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-08 20:42                       ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled tip-bot for Dave Hansen
2018-01-08 20:53                       ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 21:32                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10  0:45                           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10  1:11                             ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 16:02                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  6:49                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05  6:57                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05  7:13                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:14                       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:21                         ` David Lang
2018-01-07 18:49                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:44                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:55                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 22:10                             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08  9:18                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  9:29                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08 16:22                               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 16:53                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05 12:12                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09  1:44                   ` Samir Bellabes
     [not found]                 ` <CAL9bgJ8XNJgCtxR6+M+Vm9eDBVZ4Dyi_-Lt-Q1ei9N=TE2c6cg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-01-07  5:04                   ` Fwd: " Kiernan Hager
2018-01-07  6:39                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:01                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 17:47                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:01                         ` Ivan Ivanov
2018-01-07 18:16                           ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:26   ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:54     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 18:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 20:08       ` Jon Masters
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-04  2:00 Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 11:49 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 12:09   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 13:32     ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-12  8:20 Dr. Greg Wettstein
2018-02-23 21:10 Ywe Cærlyn

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