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From: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
To: "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	"tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com" <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
	"torvalds@linux-foundation.org" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"dave.hansen@intel.com" <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86: Use IBRS for firmware update path
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 17:37:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180105163749.GV26807@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180105160848.GD17349@kroah.com>

On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:08:48PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 08:08:55PM +0000, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> > On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 21:05 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> > > > 
> > > > We are impervious to the indirect branch prediction attack with
> > > > retpoline
> > > > but firmware won't be, so we still need to set IBRS to protect
> > > > firmware code execution when calling into firmware at runtime.
> > > Wait, what?
> > > 
> > > Maybe it's just the wine from dinner talking, but if the firmware has
> > > issues, we have bigger things to worry about here, right?  It already
> > > handed over the "chain of trust" to us, so we have already implicitly
> > > trusted that the firmware was correct here.  So why do we need to do
> > > anything about firmware calls in this manner?
> > 
> > In the ideal world, firmware exists to boot the kernel and then it gets
> > out of the way, never to be thought of again.
> > 
> > In the Intel world, firmware idiocy permeates everything and we
> > sometimes end up making calls to it at runtime.
> > 
> > If an attacker can poison the BTB for an indirect branch in EFI
> > firmware, then reliably do something which calls EFI runtime calls,
> > that might lead to an exploit. So if we're using retpoline for the
> > kernel, then we should be setting IBRS before any firmware calls.
> 
> Ugh, ok, seems a bit far-fetched to me, but I will not object anymore.
> 
> Except that the patch doesn't actually build, which means no one has
> actually tested it at all :(

One more wish, I personally would prefer the whole:

+#if defined(RETPOLINE)                                                                                               

to be dropped too and if this could be respinned without any REPTOLINE
knowledge at all. It can't be activated anyway so it should go in a
different patchset that can actually activate it if something but
that's much lower prio.

It was great info to know reptoline still needs IBRS anyway though.

Thanks,
Andrea

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-05 16:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-04 17:56 [PATCH 0/7] IBRS patch series Tim Chen
2018-01-04 17:56 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/feature: Detect the x86 feature to control Speculation Tim Chen
2018-01-04 19:58   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04 20:47     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-05 11:14   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-05 17:07       ` Tim Chen
2018-01-05 13:09   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05 13:44     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05 13:51       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 17:56 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/enter: MACROS to set/clear IBRS Tim Chen
2018-01-04 22:16   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-04 22:21     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 22:23       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05  4:54         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-05  5:05           ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05 13:19       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 17:56 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts Tim Chen
2018-01-04 20:00   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04 20:26     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 20:45   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 22:33   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-04 23:12     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05  0:08     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05  4:51       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-05  5:11         ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05 12:01           ` Alan Cox
2018-01-05 13:35   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 17:56 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/idle: Disable IBRS entering idle and enable it on wakeup Tim Chen
2018-01-04 22:47   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-04 23:00     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 23:22     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 23:42       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 23:45         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  0:03           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-08  8:24       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-04 17:56 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86: Use IBRS for firmware update path Tim Chen
2018-01-04 18:48   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 20:05   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04 20:08     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 16:08       ` gregkh
2018-01-05 16:37         ` Andrea Arcangeli [this message]
2018-01-04 20:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:48     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 20:51   ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-01-04 21:13     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 22:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-05 13:40   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 17:56 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable SPEC_CTRL feature Tim Chen
2018-01-04 18:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-04 18:36     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 18:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-04 18:57         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 18:59         ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 19:06           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-05 13:48       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 18:38     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 18:54       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 18:56         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-04 18:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-04 18:34   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 19:02     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 18:50   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 20:16   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04 20:58     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 22:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-04 23:26     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 23:51       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 23:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-05  0:07           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05 11:16   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-06  1:29     ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 17:56 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/microcode: Recheck IBRS features on microcode reload Tim Chen
2018-01-04 18:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-04 18:34     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 18:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-04 19:10         ` Tim Chen
2018-01-05 13:32         ` Greg KH
2018-01-05 13:37           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-05 13:47             ` Greg KH
2018-01-05 15:28           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 19:00 ` [PATCH 0/7] IBRS patch series Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 19:19   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 19:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 19:39       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 19:40       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 19:46         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 21:22       ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-05 11:32         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-05 12:09           ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 14:45           ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-05 14:43         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05 14:52           ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-05 15:03             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05 14:54           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05 11:52       ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 14:28         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 14:42           ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-05 15:38             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 16:05               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05 16:37                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 16:42                   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-05 16:44                     ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-05 16:46                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05  5:25   ` Florian Weimer
2018-01-05 11:05     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 19:05 ` Justin Forbes
2018-01-04 19:10   ` Tim Chen
2018-01-04 21:01     ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-01-05 13:28       ` Greg KH
2018-01-05 13:47         ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-01-05 14:01           ` Greg KH
2018-01-05 14:26             ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-05 14:54               ` Yves-Alexis Perez

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