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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 15:31:08 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180110153107.GB2451@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515597645.22302.187.camel@amazon.co.uk>

* Woodhouse, David (dwmw@amazon.co.uk) wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-01-08 at 02:42 -0800, Paul Turner wrote:
> > 
> > While the cases above involve the crafting and use of poisoned
> > entries.  Recall also that one of the initial conditions was that we
> > should avoid RSB underflow as some CPUs may try to use other indirect
> > predictors when this occurs.
> 
> I think we should start by deliberately ignoring the CPUs which use the
> other indirect predictors on RSB underflow. Those CPUs don't perform
> *quite* so badly with IBRS anyway.
> 
> Let's get the minimum amount of RSB handling in to cope with the pre-
> SKL CPUs, and then see if we really do want to extend it to make SKL
> 100% secure in retpoline mode or not.

How do you make decisions on which CPU you're running on?
I'm worried about the case of a VM that starts off on an older host
and then gets live migrated to a new Skylake.
For Intel CPUs we've historically been safe to live migrate
to any newer host based on having all the features that the old one had;
with the guest still seeing the flags etc for the old CPU.

Dave
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-10 15:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-07 22:11 [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 10:53     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 11:03       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 12:45         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:42   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 13:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 13:53       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 14:26         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 21:20           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 12:36       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 13:35         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 13:40         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:49   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] x86/retpoline/irq32: " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] x86/retpoline: Add boot time option to disable retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] x86/retpoline: Exclude objtool with retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:25   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:34     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-08 13:20       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:22 ` [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 10:01   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 17:54   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 21:10     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:34 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:38   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-08 10:45     ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:42   ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 11:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-08 11:25       ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 16:13     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 15:20     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-10 15:31       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2018-01-08 10:45   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:53     ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 12:49       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:44 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:56   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:58     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09  0:35       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  0:42         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09  0:48           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  0:55             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09  0:44         ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09  0:58           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  1:15             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09  3:27               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-09 13:04                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 13:10                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 17:53                   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-09 18:09                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-16  8:58                   ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-09  1:16             ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09  1:21               ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch II Andi Kleen
2018-01-09  1:23                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09  1:49                   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09  1:53                 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-09  1:18             ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09  0:06     ` Andi Kleen

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