From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 11:09:43 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180116020943.GC6607@jagdpanzerIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180115075231.0d435fec@gandalf.local.home>
On (01/15/18 07:52), Steven Rostedt wrote:
[..]
> I'm very skeptical that such an approach has much benefit. From the
> email referenced above:
agreed. dmesg can be SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT.
so the patch is *probably* aiming the systems in which anyone can read
dmesg, but we kinda don't want that to happen. may be I'm missing the
point.
> > I am not sure that desktop and power users would like to have their
> > kernel message encrypted, but there are scenarios such as in mobile
> > devices, where only the developers, makers of devices, may actually
> > benefit from access to kernel prints messages, and the users may be
> > more protected from exploits.
>
> Do you have any backing from makers of such devices? I'd like to hear
> from Google's Android team or whoever that would turn this feature on.
>
> I would be hard pressed to add such a feature if it's never used.
right.
-ss
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-16 2:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-13 21:34 [PATCHv2 0/7] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 1/7] crypto: fix memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad encryption Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 2/7] Move net/ceph/armor to lib/ and add docs Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 3/7] base64-armor: add bounds checking Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 4/7] certs: allow in-kernel access of trusted keys Dan Aloni
2018-01-15 9:11 ` David Howells
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption Dan Aloni
2018-01-14 1:48 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2018-01-14 8:01 ` Dan Aloni
2018-01-15 12:52 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-01-16 2:09 ` Sergey Senozhatsky [this message]
2018-01-16 23:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2018-01-17 15:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 6/7] tools: add dmesg decryption program Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 7/7] docs: add dmesg encryption doc Dan Aloni
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