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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Proposal: CAP_PAYLOAD to reduce Meltdown and Spectre mitigation costs
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 23:49:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180118224924.GF17196@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a5398c4e-be02-0de6-5c76-c37320011eef@scylladb.com>

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On Sat 2018-01-06 21:33:28, Avi Kivity wrote:
> Meltdown and Spectre mitigations focus on protecting the kernel from a
> hostile userspace. However, it's not a given that the kernel is the most
> important target in the system. It is common in server workloads that a
> single userspace application contains the valuable data on a system, and if
> it were hostile, the game would already be over, without the need to
> compromise the kernel.
> 
> 
> In these workloads, a single application performs most system calls, and so
> it pays the cost of protection, without benefiting from it directly (since
> it is the target, rather than the kernel).
> 
> 
> I propose to create a new capability, CAP_PAYLOAD, that allows the system
> administrator to designate an application as the main workload in that
> system. Other processes (like sshd or monitoring daemons) exist to support
> it, and so it makes sense to protect the rest of the system from their being
> compromised.

prctl(I_AM_PAYLOAD) may do the trick. CAP_PAYLOAD is bad idea.

prctl() should require some pretty heavy capabilities, similar to
iopl() / ioperm() syscalls on x86, maybe CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Maybe it can
depend on some other capability.

But merely having the capability should definitely not change system
behaviour.

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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      parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-18 22:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-06 19:33 Proposal: CAP_PAYLOAD to reduce Meltdown and Spectre mitigation costs Avi Kivity
2018-01-06 20:02 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07  9:16   ` Avi Kivity
2018-01-07 12:29     ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-07 12:34       ` Ozgur
2018-01-07 12:51       ` Avi Kivity
2018-01-07 18:06         ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-06 20:24 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07  9:14   ` Avi Kivity
2018-01-07 17:39     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:36   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 15:15     ` Avi Kivity
2018-01-07 17:26     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08  1:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-01-18 22:49 ` Pavel Machek [this message]

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