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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 49/89] x86/mm: Encrypt the initrd earlier for BSP microcode update
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 09:45:29 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180122083959.619534286@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180122083954.683903493@linuxfoundation.org>

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

commit 107cd2532181b96c549e8f224cdcca8631c3076b upstream.

Currently the BSP microcode update code examines the initrd very early
in the boot process.  If SME is active, the initrd is treated as being
encrypted but it has not been encrypted (in place) yet.  Update the
early boot code that encrypts the kernel to also encrypt the initrd so
that early BSP microcode updates work.

Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192634.6026.10452.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |    4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    8 ----
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S     |   46 ++++++++++++-------------
 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *rea
 
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
-void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void);
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp);
 void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
 
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_boot
 
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
-static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
+static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsign
 	p = fixup_pointer(&phys_base, physaddr);
 	*p += load_delta - sme_get_me_mask();
 
-	/* Encrypt the kernel (if SME is active) */
-	sme_encrypt_kernel();
+	/* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
+	sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
 
 	/*
 	 * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -376,14 +376,6 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
 	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
 		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
 
-	/*
-	 * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
-	 * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
-	 * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
-	 * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
-	 */
-	sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
-
 	initrd_start = 0;
 
 	mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -487,11 +487,12 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_
 	return total;
 }
 
-void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
 	unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
 	unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len;
+	unsigned long initrd_start, initrd_end, initrd_len;
 	struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd;
 	unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
 	unsigned long decrypted_base;
@@ -500,14 +501,15 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 		return;
 
 	/*
-	 * Prepare for encrypting the kernel by building new pagetables with
-	 * the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the kernel in place.
+	 * Prepare for encrypting the kernel and initrd by building new
+	 * pagetables with the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the
+	 * kernel in place.
 	 *
 	 *   One range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
-	 *   by the kernel as encrypted.
+	 *   by the kernel and initrd as encrypted.
 	 *
 	 *   Another range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
-	 *   by the kernel as decrypted and write-protected.
+	 *   by the kernel and initrd as decrypted and write-protected.
 	 *
 	 *     The use of write-protect attribute will prevent any of the
 	 *     memory from being cached.
@@ -518,6 +520,20 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	kernel_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(_end), PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
 	kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
 
+	initrd_start = 0;
+	initrd_end = 0;
+	initrd_len = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
+	initrd_len = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_size |
+		     ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_size << 32);
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		initrd_start = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_image |
+			       ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_image << 32);
+		initrd_end = PAGE_ALIGN(initrd_start + initrd_len);
+		initrd_len = initrd_end - initrd_start;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/* Set the encryption workarea to be immediately after the kernel */
 	workarea_start = kernel_end;
 
@@ -540,6 +556,8 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	 */
 	pgtable_area_len = sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
 	pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_end - kernel_start) * 2;
+	if (initrd_len)
+		pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(initrd_len) * 2;
 
 	/* PUDs and PMDs needed in the current pagetables for the workarea */
 	pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_len + pgtable_area_len);
@@ -578,9 +596,9 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * A new pagetable structure is being built to allow for the kernel
-	 * to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will then be
-	 * populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and decrypted
-	 * kernel mappings are created.
+	 * and initrd to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will
+	 * then be populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and
+	 * decrypted kernel mappings are created.
 	 */
 	ppd.pgd = ppd.pgtable_area;
 	memset(ppd.pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
@@ -593,6 +611,12 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	 * the base of the mapping.
 	 */
 	decrypted_base = (pgd_index(workarea_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		unsigned long check_base;
+
+		check_base = (pgd_index(initrd_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+		decrypted_base = max(decrypted_base, check_base);
+	}
 	decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT;
 
 	/* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
@@ -607,6 +631,21 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
 	sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
 
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		/* Add encrypted initrd (identity) mappings */
+		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
+		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start;
+		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end;
+		sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
+		/*
+		 * Add decrypted, write-protected initrd (non-identity) mappings
+		 */
+		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
+		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
+		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
+		sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
+	}
+
 	/* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
 	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
 	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
@@ -622,6 +661,11 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
 			    kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
 
+	if (initrd_len)
+		sme_encrypt_execute(initrd_start, initrd_start + decrypted_base,
+				    initrd_len, workarea_start,
+				    (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
+
 	/*
 	 * At this point we are running encrypted.  Remove the mappings for
 	 * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove
@@ -631,6 +675,12 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
 	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
 
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
+		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
+		sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
+	}
+
 	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
 	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
 	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
 
 	/*
 	 * Entry parameters:
-	 *   RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
-	 *   RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
-	 *   RDX - length of kernel
+	 *   RDI - virtual address for the encrypted mapping
+	 *   RSI - virtual address for the decrypted mapping
+	 *   RDX - length to encrypt
 	 *   RCX - virtual address of the encryption workarea, including:
 	 *     - stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
 	 *     - encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
 	addq	$PAGE_SIZE, %rax	/* Workarea encryption routine */
 
 	push	%r12
-	movq	%rdi, %r10		/* Encrypted kernel */
-	movq	%rsi, %r11		/* Decrypted kernel */
-	movq	%rdx, %r12		/* Kernel length */
+	movq	%rdi, %r10		/* Encrypted area */
+	movq	%rsi, %r11		/* Decrypted area */
+	movq	%rdx, %r12		/* Area length */
 
 	/* Copy encryption routine into the workarea */
 	movq	%rax, %rdi				/* Workarea encryption routine */
@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
 	rep	movsb
 
 	/* Setup registers for call */
-	movq	%r10, %rdi		/* Encrypted kernel */
-	movq	%r11, %rsi		/* Decrypted kernel */
+	movq	%r10, %rdi		/* Encrypted area */
+	movq	%r11, %rsi		/* Decrypted area */
 	movq	%r8, %rdx		/* Pagetables used for encryption */
-	movq	%r12, %rcx		/* Kernel length */
+	movq	%r12, %rcx		/* Area length */
 	movq	%rax, %r8		/* Workarea encryption routine */
 	addq	$PAGE_SIZE, %r8		/* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */
 
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ ENDPROC(sme_encrypt_execute)
 
 ENTRY(__enc_copy)
 /*
- * Routine used to encrypt kernel.
+ * Routine used to encrypt memory in place.
  *   This routine must be run outside of the kernel proper since
  *   the kernel will be encrypted during the process. So this
  *   routine is defined here and then copied to an area outside
@@ -79,19 +79,19 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy)
  *   during execution.
  *
  *   On entry the registers must be:
- *     RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
- *     RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
+ *     RDI - virtual address for the encrypted mapping
+ *     RSI - virtual address for the decrypted mapping
  *     RDX - address of the pagetables to use for encryption
- *     RCX - length of kernel
+ *     RCX - length of area
  *      R8 - intermediate copy buffer
  *
  *     RAX - points to this routine
  *
- * The kernel will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted
- * kernel space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the
- * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted kernel space. The physical
- * addresses of the two kernel space mappings are the same which
- * results in the kernel being encrypted "in place".
+ * The area will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted
+ * memory space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the
+ * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted memory space. The physical
+ * addresses of the two mappings are the same which results in the area
+ * being encrypted "in place".
  */
 	/* Enable the new page tables */
 	mov	%rdx, %cr3
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy)
 	push	%r15
 	push	%r12
 
-	movq	%rcx, %r9		/* Save kernel length */
-	movq	%rdi, %r10		/* Save encrypted kernel address */
-	movq	%rsi, %r11		/* Save decrypted kernel address */
+	movq	%rcx, %r9		/* Save area length */
+	movq	%rdi, %r10		/* Save encrypted area address */
+	movq	%rsi, %r11		/* Save decrypted area address */
 
 	/* Set the PAT register PA5 entry to write-protect */
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx
@@ -128,13 +128,13 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy)
 	movq	%r9, %r12
 
 2:
-	movq	%r11, %rsi		/* Source - decrypted kernel */
+	movq	%r11, %rsi		/* Source - decrypted area */
 	movq	%r8, %rdi		/* Dest   - intermediate copy buffer */
 	movq	%r12, %rcx
 	rep	movsb
 
 	movq	%r8, %rsi		/* Source - intermediate copy buffer */
-	movq	%r10, %rdi		/* Dest   - encrypted kernel */
+	movq	%r10, %rdi		/* Dest   - encrypted area */
 	movq	%r12, %rcx
 	rep	movsb
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-22  8:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-22  8:44 [PATCH 4.14 00/89] 4.14.15-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/89] tools/objtool/Makefile: dont assume sync-check.sh is executable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/89] drm/nouveau/disp/gf119: add missing drive vfunc ptr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/89] objtool: Fix seg fault with clang-compiled objects Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/89] objtool: Fix Clang enum conversion warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/89] objtool: Fix seg fault caused by missing parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/89] powerpc/pseries: Add H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/89] powerpc/64: Add macros for annotating the destination of rfid/hrfid Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/89] powerpc/64s: Simple RFI macro conversions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/89] powerpc/64: Convert the syscall exit path to use RFI_TO_USER/KERNEL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/89] powerpc/64: Convert fast_exception_return " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/89] powerpc/64s: Convert slb_miss_common " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/89] powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/89] powerpc/64s: Support disabling RFI flush with no_rfi_flush and nopti Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/89] powerpc/pseries: Query hypervisor for RFI flush settings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/89] powerpc/powernv: Check device-tree " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/89] futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  9:48   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-22  9:53     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22 10:04       ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/89] futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-25 13:45   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-25 14:03     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 14:06       ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-25 14:30         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 14:47           ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-25 15:12             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-25 15:21               ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-25 15:30                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-25 21:42                 ` Darren Hart
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/89] ALSA: seq: Make ioctls race-free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:44 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/89] ALSA: pcm: Remove yet superfluous WARN_ON() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/89] ALSA: hda - Apply headphone noise quirk for another Dell XPS 13 variant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/89] ALSA: hda - Apply the existing quirk to iMac 14,1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/89] IB/hfi1: Prevent a NULL dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/89] RDMA/mlx5: Fix out-of-bound access while querying AH Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/89] timers: Unconditionally check deferrable base Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/89] af_key: fix buffer overread in verify_address_len() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/89] af_key: fix buffer overread in parse_exthdrs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/89] iser-target: Fix possible use-after-free in connection establishment error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/89] delayacct: Account blkio completion on the correct task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/89] objtool: Fix seg fault with gold linker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/89] mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: Fix i.MX53 eSDHCv3 clock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/89] x86/kasan: Panic if there is not enough memory to boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/89] x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/89] x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/89] objtool: Improve error message for bad file argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/89] x86/cpufeature: Move processor tracing out of scattered features Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/89] module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/89] x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Prevent use after free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/89] x86/mm/pkeys: Fix fill_sig_info_pkey Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/89] x86/idt: Mark IDT tables __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/89] x86/tsc: Future-proof native_calibrate_tsc() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/89] x86/tsc: Fix erroneous TSC rate on Skylake Xeon Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/89] pipe: avoid round_pipe_size() nr_pages overflow on 32-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/89] x86/apic/vector: Fix off by one in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/89] x86/mm: Clean up register saving in the __enc_copy() assembly code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/89] x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/89] x86/mm: Centralize PMD flags in sme_encrypt_kernel() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/89] x86/mm: Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() for PAGE aligned encryption Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 48/89] ARM: OMAP3: hwmod_data: add missing module_offs for MMC3 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 50/89] Input: ALPS - fix multi-touch decoding on SS4 plus touchpads Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 51/89] Input: synaptics-rmi4 - prevent UAF reported by KASAN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 52/89] Input: 88pm860x-ts - fix child-node lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 53/89] Input: twl6040-vibra " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 54/89] Input: twl4030-vibra - fix sibling-node lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 55/89] tracing: Fix converting enums from the map in trace_event_eval_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 56/89] phy: work around phys references to usb-nop-xceiv devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 57/89] ARM64: dts: marvell: armada-cp110: Fix clock resources for various node Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 58/89] ARM: sunxi_defconfig: Enable CMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 59/89] ARM: dts: kirkwood: fix pin-muxing of MPP7 on OpenBlocks A7 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 60/89] can: peak: fix potential bug in packet fragmentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 61/89] can: af_can: can_rcv(): replace WARN_ONCE by pr_warn_once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 62/89] can: af_can: canfd_rcv(): " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 63/89] i2c: core-smbus: prevent stack corruption on read I2C_BLOCK_DATA Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 64/89] scripts/gdb/linux/tasks.py: fix get_thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 65/89] proc: fix coredump vs read /proc/*/stat race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 66/89] libata: apply MAX_SEC_1024 to all LITEON EP1 series devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 67/89] scsi: libsas: Disable asynchronous aborts for SATA devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 68/89] workqueue: avoid hard lockups in show_workqueue_state() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 69/89] drm/vmwgfx: fix memory corruption with legacy/sou connectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 70/89] dm btree: fix serious bug in btree_split_beneath() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 71/89] dm thin metadata: THIN_MAX_CONCURRENT_LOCKS should be 6 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 72/89] dm integrity: dont store cipher request on the stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 73/89] dm crypt: fix crash by adding missing check for auth key size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 74/89] dm crypt: wipe kernel key copy after IV initialization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 75/89] dm crypt: fix error return code in crypt_ctr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 76/89] x86: Use __nostackprotect for sme_encrypt_kernel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 77/89] alpha/PCI: Fix noname IRQ level detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 78/89] MIPS: CM: Drop WARN_ON(vp != 0) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:45 ` [PATCH 4.14 79/89] KVM: arm/arm64: Check pagesize when allocating a hugepage at Stage 2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 80/89] arm64: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 81/89] x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 82/89] retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 83/89] kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 84/89] kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 85/89] x86/pti: Document fix wrong index Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 86/89] x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 87/89] x86/mm: Rework wbinvd, hlt operation in stop_this_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 88/89] mm, page_vma_mapped: Drop faulty pointer arithmetics in check_pte() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22  8:46 ` [PATCH 4.14 89/89] net: mvpp2: do not disable GMAC padding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22 19:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/89] 4.14.15-stable review Guenter Roeck
2018-01-23  6:36   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22 20:39 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-01-22 21:00 ` Shuah Khan
2018-01-23  0:08 ` kernelci.org bot

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