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From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 17:07:03 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180124170652.4c78ca17@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516811127.13558.150.camel@infradead.org>

>  
> +static const __initdata struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
> +	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD },
> +	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
> +	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
> +	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
> +	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
> +	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },

As Linus said this should be no_specualtion[]

If we are going to capture 32bit here with your lines below I'll send you
an update at some point with all the 32bit families hunted down (some
like the CE4100 may take a bit of hunting)


> +	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY, 5 },

AND K5 speculates, Cyrix 6x86 speculates, IDT WinChip does not. I think
this should be

X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4
X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5,
X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5,


> +static bool __init early_cpu_vulnerable_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> +	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
> +
> +	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
> +                return false;

These processors are also not vulnerable to spectre, so this patch
doesn't set the other flags correctly - that's why we need two levels of
logic here. "Bonnell" and "Saltwell" uarch Atom processors are not
vulnerable to Meltdown or Spectre, neithr is a 486, Pentium, Quark etc.



> +
> +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
> +	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Do minimum CPU detection early.
>   * Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask,
> @@ -900,9 +929,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  
>  	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
>  
> -	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
> +	if (early_cpu_vulnerable_meltdown(c))
>  		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
> -
>  	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
>  	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
>  
> -- 
> 2.14.3

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-24 17:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-23 16:52 [PATCH v2 0/5] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  1:23     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-24  1:28       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  8:13         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-24  8:39   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-01-24  8:40     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:27   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:31     ` Greg KH
2018-01-23 18:48       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:12   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-24  1:21     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:40   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  1:27     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:41   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:44     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 18:45   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-23 19:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-23 20:45       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-23 20:38     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-23 20:50     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 16:25     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:07       ` Alan Cox [this message]
2018-01-24 17:42         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 18:40           ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 18:59             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 19:37             ` David Woodhouse

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