From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: mingo@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, jpoimboe@redhat.com, "Wieczorkiewicz,
Pawel" <wipawel@amazon.de>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
arjan@linux.intel.com, karahmed@amazon.de, x86@kernel.org,
bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
gregkh@linux-foundation.org, luto@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2018 20:39:02 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180204193901.GA29757@light.dominikbrodowski.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2f5614a5-b7c4-52cf-a66f-6f62c2602bee@linux.intel.com> <1517473913.18619.281.camel@infradead.org>
On Thu, Feb 01, 2018 at 08:31:53AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-01-31 at 08:03 +0100, Dominik Brodowski wrote:
> > Whether a process needs protection by IBPB on context switches is a
> > different question to whether a process should be allowed to be dumped,
> > though the former may be a superset of the latter. Enable IBPB on all
> > context switches to a different userspace process, until we have a clear
> > mitigation strategy for userspace against Spectre-v2 designed and
> > implemented.
> >
> > ...
> > if (tsk && tsk->mm &&
> > - tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id &&
> > - get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
> > + tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id)
> > indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
>
>
> I understand your argument and I sympathise.
>
> But that's going to hurt a *lot*, and we don't even have a viable
> proof-of-concept for a user←→user Spectre v2 attack, do we? It's only
> theoretical?
Wasn't the PoC in the Spectre paper user←→user (though on a different OS)?
And what makes KVM←→KVM so much more likely/dangerous/..., that IBPB will
be done there unconditionally (AFAICS)?
And, somewhat related, @Tim Chen:
On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 03:25:44PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> For people who opt for more security, it is reasonable to consider
> alternate policies to distinguish friend and foe so we know if we are coming
> from a potentially hostile environment. Ptrace is one means to do so, and probably
> there are other ways depending on usages. I hope we can have a discussion on what we should
> use to determine if two processes are friend or foe. Say do all the processes
> from the same containers are considered friends with each other?
To my understanding, the concept of "containers" is meant to be kept outside
of the kernel. What *namespaces* / *control groups* can be considered
friends with each other?
Thanks,
Dominik
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-04 19:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-29 22:04 [PATCH] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 17:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-30 21:23 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 22:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 22:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 22:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 3:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-31 23:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 20:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 21:03 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 21:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 22:26 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-30 22:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 0:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-31 0:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-30 22:39 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Tim Chen
2018-01-31 7:03 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-01-31 13:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-01 8:25 ` Christian Brauner
2018-02-01 8:31 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-01 15:40 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-04 19:39 ` Dominik Brodowski [this message]
2018-02-05 14:18 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-05 19:35 ` Tim Chen
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