From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x225aBXLho2RmRXCdDshGKb9nLtiZ63qxm0USOdzmFpyjTGdNR1dzh9//WXrk4qjWEk4NBUb2 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1519411278; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=b5blhmQNIkQyxZ849orM1ggAUGitASeUiG+NhgNF8xI/N+fYsI1NLebd5vwG0tYutD 07irfTzNyqIT+LqGjhcTCVbQRVCmlCX59/zinOeAkRJij7Le9UpP7CnRJEQGA2xVL4v0 26nEwgdMaQNR9IF62rW41ZQnqTOrSKWzC+bcEfo7MsyTmvwNJqi6LFQGGK/d5Tumy9E2 7Sx5JCyOQztaLNrmzESA4YILFjMV5UiUohvcyV77ws8+xdF3jOxWKgzvSsv8Q2TMaT1/ K82/BiiZsMlcuKpxEUwC96ixDmHDyLXpEN/jI9Vy2d3qgcwFJwptIIWKYAjp4UTPICBm 9xIg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=mime-version:user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date :subject:cc:to:from:arc-authentication-results; bh=KiPTVwYJFVmZZdYYvM4SEHBLi3ncyzmye2RndcCEA2s=; b=G9Zvm1vzktHl+E9Edjx2f4N8zAwqSMUeIxjJ/fCrbMDqFWwZeqBmy/7+ITB1ACiQe5 lRfU7lcMxzoHenK0Lx5tm5DknQfPbTxT6aVmO434FNGdOGy+Ubc+cOfyw+NZBMHBR+bB d6/22BmJW06cB9HYP9EKnkTysepSzjScAvBeoXPZPA+CQy5oJ+FwqcxnyGeVZ93Id8qR Q60V8y4ldRjb2gHM7FQOnuGk/IKVnb3siUvtwCgvBMApHGQZyrhlfYJXYcjmogXhqPqb wZivo+rqicNaNUJHBNGysd0yyGqEQncz4ULloMVUaNJobWe7MSbEf17a5wWU2scWbWuI 39pQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning gregkh@linuxfoundation.org does not designate 90.92.71.90 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning gregkh@linuxfoundation.org does not designate 90.92.71.90 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Jiri Slaby , Dan Williams , Thomas Gleixner , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com, David Woodhouse , Jack Wang Subject: [PATCH 4.4 181/193] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 19:26:54 +0100 Message-Id: <20180223170354.510966870@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180223170325.997716448@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180223170325.997716448@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-LABELS: =?utf-8?b?IlxcU2VudCI=?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1593218200797173841?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1593218200797173841?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams (cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360) Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,