From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x225pGPtPHbH2paf3Z2NF5oXJPR4tiMt1GBONKyJh6xRDRLqsErav7Nd7tlDWSymAZsIPIFzo ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1519676610; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=IDW2/Qkj1kdbwDDhPe/BpdVhQjL82m1pu6GGEbwgiyS89UntqPG/z9g1s0IAbrita7 txHYvxLOIyuAzqEUDVATzUUbXWd+VMW+4g690GhLjsEtmvgSLzvD6LAP0mSw3epfewvJ lTFdlPjIyzVe43UR5ljsOYpClXLdlk53TiexSpNzHmTCDCMbrFrFlRpO2OxScdoXO8uj Hqaro7l2+hTTU6E3GLDFd/WKUzV2qHALtiKka3SFXR5a1dY8E7Xdgrw1wbEYsGek2tad KM2xikF8U1kmO4Ua+QeOZyWAsTfrPt9Iae8jQpzKbq4mAKn1xp4Oc/46BaW7zG7S9+Yo Blbw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=mime-version:user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date :subject:cc:to:from:arc-authentication-results; bh=nj1OrQlk2uBQaaL/wX9hqhFZW7qeyUjjpseHtEYadNo=; b=Yyxih+qONiV8xtJxHSIeUsXkQsupZJxnVWqWQhMY+48+dXhkFze0SXt8LyebhyWJ+y EQ7tHJPi7rAsAahin9+6WwPEd3qd0jeFUSaTJi0chGiOgjeEVSpKNVQ65Xn0ZjoDTpEL CccbD3sRnylRx2QKsotkuOcAXDOsxEBsr+gzvTLGd8iMyHWHv2EvgC2+ldfmf7lnQIx3 ZHiYnB7Zp3iIRWnKgfZHo31LgYOTYmKDnqWLH/ANwKdzDa2DDqW9NAoESnaWsmnkM+Wy YnVxa0Nv8DXpzyhd5nVJOdbmUjYubzmBk/KDG9fCbdvfUt+uCfbFMASS4xQhhd4e6wza t3mg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning gregkh@linuxfoundation.org does not designate 83.175.124.243 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning gregkh@linuxfoundation.org does not designate 83.175.124.243 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers , David Howells Subject: [PATCH 4.14 14/54] PKCS#7: fix certificate blacklisting Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 21:21:51 +0100 Message-Id: <20180226202145.084527004@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180226202144.375869933@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180226202144.375869933@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-LABELS: =?utf-8?b?IlxcU2VudCI=?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1593496421895342058?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1593496421895342058?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Biggers commit 29f4a67c17e19314b7d74b8569be935e6c7edf50 upstream. If there is a blacklisted certificate in a SignerInfo's certificate chain, then pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() sets sinfo->blacklisted and returns 0. But, pkcs7_verify() fails to handle this case appropriately, as it actually continues on to the line 'actual_ret = 0;', indicating that the SignerInfo has passed verification. Consequently, PKCS#7 signature verification ignores the certificate blacklist. Fix this by not considering blacklisted SignerInfos to have passed verification. Also fix the function comment with regards to when 0 is returned. Fixes: 03bb79315ddc ("PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates") Cc: # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -369,8 +369,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7 * * (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or: * - * (*) 0 if no signature chains were found to be blacklisted or to contain - * unsupported crypto, or: + * (*) 0 if a signature chain passed verification, or: * * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or: * @@ -426,8 +425,11 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *p for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo); - if (sinfo->blacklisted && actual_ret == -ENOPKG) - actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + if (sinfo->blacklisted) { + if (actual_ret == -ENOPKG) + actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + continue; + } if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOPKG) { sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true;