From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933291AbeCBWCa (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Mar 2018 17:02:30 -0500 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:39297 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932815AbeCBWBA (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Mar 2018 17:01:00 -0500 From: "Eric W. Biederman" To: Miklos Szeredi Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Alban Crequy , Seth Forshee , Sargun Dhillon , Dongsu Park , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Linus Torvalds , "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 15:59:19 -0600 Message-Id: <20180302215919.27207-6-ebiederm@xmission.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <87r2p287i8.fsf_-_@xmission.com> References: <87r2p287i8.fsf_-_@xmission.com> X-XM-SPF: eid=1ersjZ-0000ts-NM;;;mid=<20180302215919.27207-6-ebiederm@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=174.19.85.160;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX196h5zsM4VeLBTVW4lH/rhDzbWOfpJ+gaY= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 174.19.85.160 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5010] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=165] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=165 X-Spam-Combo: ;Miklos Szeredi X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 1219 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.11 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 3.2 (0.3%), b_tie_ro: 2.1 (0.2%), parse: 0.78 (0.1%), extract_message_metadata: 16 (1.3%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.74 (0.1%), tests_pri_-1000: 7 (0.6%), tests_pri_-950: 1.02 (0.1%), tests_pri_-900: 0.81 (0.1%), tests_pri_-400: 20 (1.6%), check_bayes: 19 (1.5%), b_tokenize: 6 (0.5%), b_tok_get_all: 7 (0.5%), b_comp_prob: 1.75 (0.1%), b_tok_touch_all: 2.6 (0.2%), b_finish: 0.55 (0.0%), tests_pri_0: 1162 (95.3%), check_dkim_signature: 0.48 (0.0%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.9 (0.2%), tests_pri_500: 7 (0.5%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH v8 6/6] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Seth Forshee Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace. Also export current_in_userns() for use by fuse when built as a module. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: Miklos Szeredi Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index c749a4bd4ea3..5461b63bb2a4 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc) const struct cred *cred; if (fc->allow_other) - return 1; + return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns); cred = current_cred(); if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) && diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 246d4d4ce5c7..492c255e6c5a 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -1235,6 +1235,7 @@ bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns) { return in_userns(target_ns, current_user_ns()); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns); static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns) { -- 2.14.1