From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932615AbeCITa0 (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Mar 2018 14:30:26 -0500 Received: from mail-pl0-f67.google.com ([209.85.160.67]:45796 "EHLO mail-pl0-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751278AbeCITaW (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Mar 2018 14:30:22 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELsjaDzxlA7RSD65c0e+e5OwvYhSo1iLxK8JYICVTr9fLu5kIvaopl2c0cwpigd6BcFgJyOIhw== Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 11:30:20 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: James Morris Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , LSM List , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , linux-integrity , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley Subject: [PATCH v2] exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check Message-ID: <20180309193020.GA5149@beast> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The LSM check should happen after the file has been confirmed to be unchanging. Without this, we could have a race between the Time of Check (the call to security_kernel_read_file() which could read the file and make access policy decisions) and the Time of Use (starting with kernel_read_file()'s reading of the file contents). In theory, file contents could change between the two. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- v2: Clarify the ToC/ToU race (Linus) Only loadpin and SELinux currently implement this hook. From what I can see, this won't change anything for either of them. IMA calls kernel_read_file(), but looking there it seems those callers won't be negatively impacted either. Can folks double-check this and send an Ack please? --- fs/exec.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 7eb8d21bcab9..a919a827d181 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -895,13 +895,13 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size, if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0) return -EINVAL; - ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id); + ret = deny_write_access(file); if (ret) return ret; - ret = deny_write_access(file); + ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id); if (ret) - return ret; + goto out; i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) { -- 2.7.4 -- Kees Cook Pixel Security