From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELspVXGe1t3+kEixKC15vTa9Wi28+URdQKZ1+AoLnYBf0PxlPXdQ8LYuVdehU9mej0XsnWHd ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1521483401; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=NmUdkRZTrvG7Xy3bvEtXsUIQgEk2xsZG7KizvQLxN/4wKLMUDV6tE7Rg8RsG5BqO5I P53IT4GSPxvcdS5CIoyebHwGrQYTelnl/Zd5uCyzl5bRzV8iB4rfsb0gaSPTs9EJ+65z yUhI9KF8a+zmQe+4UeSDGQaYRpvC1ckGw1OsNSyf9lCwNw47YTyofxXdh4Rl/ISq9kv4 +lJe15FR5iO0xhunk2qiuyd+TvsQLs1uykLk2dH2XeWD+aej3E2uU22VXrYp+Y4FFJsD B2AeyIaVTwHY8v7gMaOkb1jbe6sRUPI4FxBd4h7jAGPFwh/sfuFydbRp6UhtCsK0hK0H VMdw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=mime-version:user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date :subject:cc:to:from:arc-authentication-results; bh=NB1RTFjIlQ8wmbh3lBvu0FufAsUiwKcYTVkEIU8Oj4w=; b=aDTDGB2D6MFokP14qUspNAj6cT0PMp/QUmKlJmRpzYlvLCxTCjpRV8BX43sK/8JCAF 6VSiOrxBFUbMNEQ6akVIbQ+NpXU+1S73sMtZDRLKF7AZfRbS6GdzuLS59SuPV/o3xWFc pUeTJtJdlyijGS0s/9cvIvtwNl4TpKnsfpib0hwrRLv9qDLSkbukUakYUCJpMbdXdb4R YGAroml1gkWEdbaSWGNl55V0w0Lk0os8skeKuU74WN9InAcmDmd7FUe7jaKoqHg440JE VtECpr9+mfb0Fs3vUVNckUdefrgMzEAOlvdEuluGNGT5W9rpY9uG6jruGIVHtQuNaOBX u79w== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning gregkh@linuxfoundation.org does not designate 90.92.61.202 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=softfail (google.com: domain of transitioning gregkh@linuxfoundation.org does not designate 90.92.61.202 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin , Masami Hiramatsu , Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli , Anil S Keshavamurthy , Borislav Petkov , Brian Gerst , "David S . Miller" , Denys Vlasenko , "H. Peter Anvin" , Josh Poimboeuf , Linus Torvalds , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Ye Xiaolong , Ingo Molnar , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.4 076/134] kprobes/x86: Set kprobes pages read-only Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 19:05:59 +0100 Message-Id: <20180319171900.247219741@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180319171849.024066323@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180319171849.024066323@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-LABELS: =?utf-8?b?IlxcU2VudCI=?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1595390679028073105?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1595390978928845552?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Masami Hiramatsu [ Upstream commit d0381c81c2f782fa2131178d11e0cfb23d50d631 ] Set the pages which is used for kprobes' singlestep buffer and optprobe's trampoline instruction buffer to readonly. This can prevent unexpected (or unintended) instruction modification. This also passes rodata_test as below. Without this patch, rodata_test shows a warning: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:235 note_page+0x7a9/0xa20 x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffffa0000000/0xffffffffa0000000 With this fix, no W+X pages are found: x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found. rodata_test: all tests were successful Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: David S . Miller Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ye Xiaolong Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149076375592.22469.14174394514338612247.stgit@devbox Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c @@ -406,6 +406,8 @@ static int arch_copy_kprobe(struct kprob { int ret; + set_memory_rw((unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn & PAGE_MASK, 1); + /* Copy an instruction with recovering if other optprobe modifies it.*/ ret = __copy_instruction(p->ainsn.insn, p->addr); if (!ret) @@ -420,6 +422,8 @@ static int arch_copy_kprobe(struct kprob else p->ainsn.boostable = -1; + set_memory_ro((unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn & PAGE_MASK, 1); + /* Check whether the instruction modifies Interrupt Flag or not */ p->ainsn.if_modifier = is_IF_modifier(p->ainsn.insn); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c @@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ int arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(struct } buf = (u8 *)op->optinsn.insn; + set_memory_rw((unsigned long)buf & PAGE_MASK, 1); /* Copy instructions into the out-of-line buffer */ ret = copy_optimized_instructions(buf + TMPL_END_IDX, op->kp.addr); @@ -392,6 +393,8 @@ int arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(struct synthesize_reljump(buf + TMPL_END_IDX + op->optinsn.size, (u8 *)op->kp.addr + op->optinsn.size); + set_memory_ro((unsigned long)buf & PAGE_MASK, 1); + flush_icache_range((unsigned long) buf, (unsigned long) buf + TMPL_END_IDX + op->optinsn.size + RELATIVEJUMP_SIZE);