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Miller" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.14 153/183] rxrpc: Dont put crypto buffers on the stack Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 12:36:13 +0200 Message-Id: <20180425103248.689790582@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180425103242.532713678@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180425103242.532713678@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: David Howells [ Upstream commit 8c2f826dc36314059ac146c78d3bf8056b626446 ] Don't put buffers of data to be handed to crypto on the stack as this may cause an assertion failure in the kernel (see below). Fix this by using an kmalloc'd buffer instead. kernel BUG at ./include/linux/scatterlist.h:147! ... RIP: 0010:rxkad_encrypt_response.isra.6+0x191/0x1b0 [rxrpc] RSP: 0018:ffffbe2fc06cfca8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff989277d59900 RCX: 0000000000000028 RDX: 0000259dc06cfd88 RSI: 0000000000000025 RDI: ffffbe30406cfd88 RBP: ffffbe2fc06cfd60 R08: ffffbe2fc06cfd08 R09: ffffbe2fc06cfd08 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff7c5f80d9f95 R13: ffffbe2fc06cfd88 R14: ffff98927a3f7aa0 R15: ffffbe2fc06cfd08 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98927fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055b1ff28f0f8 CR3: 000000001b412003 CR4: 00000000003606f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: rxkad_respond_to_challenge+0x297/0x330 [rxrpc] rxrpc_process_connection+0xd1/0x690 [rxrpc] ? process_one_work+0x1c3/0x680 ? __lock_is_held+0x59/0xa0 process_one_work+0x249/0x680 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 ? process_one_work+0x680/0x680 kthread+0x121/0x140 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Reported-by: Jonathan Billings Reported-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Jonathan Billings Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 1 net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c @@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ void rxrpc_process_connection(struct wor case -EKEYEXPIRED: case -EKEYREJECTED: goto protocol_error; + case -ENOMEM: case -EAGAIN: goto requeue_and_leave; case -ECONNABORTED: --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -773,8 +773,7 @@ static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(st { const struct rxrpc_key_token *token; struct rxkad_challenge challenge; - struct rxkad_response resp - __attribute__((aligned(8))); /* must be aligned for crypto */ + struct rxkad_response *resp; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); const char *eproto; u32 version, nonce, min_level, abort_code; @@ -818,26 +817,29 @@ static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(st token = conn->params.key->payload.data[0]; /* build the response packet */ - memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp)); - - resp.version = htonl(RXKAD_VERSION); - resp.encrypted.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); - resp.encrypted.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); - resp.encrypted.securityIndex = htonl(conn->security_ix); - resp.encrypted.inc_nonce = htonl(nonce + 1); - resp.encrypted.level = htonl(conn->params.security_level); - resp.kvno = htonl(token->kad->kvno); - resp.ticket_len = htonl(token->kad->ticket_len); - - resp.encrypted.call_id[0] = htonl(conn->channels[0].call_counter); - resp.encrypted.call_id[1] = htonl(conn->channels[1].call_counter); - resp.encrypted.call_id[2] = htonl(conn->channels[2].call_counter); - resp.encrypted.call_id[3] = htonl(conn->channels[3].call_counter); + resp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS); + if (!resp) + return -ENOMEM; + + resp->version = htonl(RXKAD_VERSION); + resp->encrypted.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch); + resp->encrypted.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid); + resp->encrypted.securityIndex = htonl(conn->security_ix); + resp->encrypted.inc_nonce = htonl(nonce + 1); + resp->encrypted.level = htonl(conn->params.security_level); + resp->kvno = htonl(token->kad->kvno); + resp->ticket_len = htonl(token->kad->ticket_len); + resp->encrypted.call_id[0] = htonl(conn->channels[0].call_counter); + resp->encrypted.call_id[1] = htonl(conn->channels[1].call_counter); + resp->encrypted.call_id[2] = htonl(conn->channels[2].call_counter); + resp->encrypted.call_id[3] = htonl(conn->channels[3].call_counter); /* calculate the response checksum and then do the encryption */ - rxkad_calc_response_checksum(&resp); - rxkad_encrypt_response(conn, &resp, token->kad); - return rxkad_send_response(conn, &sp->hdr, &resp, token->kad); + rxkad_calc_response_checksum(resp); + rxkad_encrypt_response(conn, resp, token->kad); + ret = rxkad_send_response(conn, &sp->hdr, resp, token->kad); + kfree(resp); + return ret; protocol_error: trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto); @@ -1048,8 +1050,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *_abort_code) { - struct rxkad_response response - __attribute__((aligned(8))); /* must be aligned for crypto */ + struct rxkad_response *response; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); struct rxrpc_crypt session_key; const char *eproto; @@ -1061,17 +1062,22 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct _enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->server_key)); + ret = -ENOMEM; + response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS); + if (!response) + goto temporary_error; + eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_short"); abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT; if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header), - &response, sizeof(response)) < 0) + response, sizeof(*response)) < 0) goto protocol_error; - if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(response))) + if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(*response))) BUG(); - version = ntohl(response.version); - ticket_len = ntohl(response.ticket_len); - kvno = ntohl(response.kvno); + version = ntohl(response->version); + ticket_len = ntohl(response->ticket_len); + kvno = ntohl(response->kvno); _proto("Rx RESPONSE %%%u { v=%u kv=%u tl=%u }", sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len); @@ -1105,31 +1111,31 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, skb, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key, &expiry, _abort_code); if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free; + goto temporary_error_free_resp; /* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the * response */ - rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, &response, &session_key); + rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key); eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_param"); abort_code = RXKADSEALEDINCON; - if (ntohl(response.encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch) + if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch) goto protocol_error_free; - if (ntohl(response.encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid) + if (ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid) goto protocol_error_free; - if (ntohl(response.encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) + if (ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) goto protocol_error_free; - csum = response.encrypted.checksum; - response.encrypted.checksum = 0; - rxkad_calc_response_checksum(&response); + csum = response->encrypted.checksum; + response->encrypted.checksum = 0; + rxkad_calc_response_checksum(response); eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_csum"); - if (response.encrypted.checksum != csum) + if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum) goto protocol_error_free; spin_lock(&conn->channel_lock); for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; i++) { struct rxrpc_call *call; - u32 call_id = ntohl(response.encrypted.call_id[i]); + u32 call_id = ntohl(response->encrypted.call_id[i]); eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_callid"); if (call_id > INT_MAX) @@ -1153,12 +1159,12 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_seq"); abort_code = RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE; - if (ntohl(response.encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->security_nonce + 1) + if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->security_nonce + 1) goto protocol_error_free; eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_level"); abort_code = RXKADLEVELFAIL; - level = ntohl(response.encrypted.level); + level = ntohl(response->encrypted.level); if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT) goto protocol_error_free; conn->params.security_level = level; @@ -1168,9 +1174,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct * as for a client connection */ ret = rxrpc_get_server_data_key(conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno); if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free; + goto temporary_error_free_ticket; kfree(ticket); + kfree(response); _leave(" = 0"); return 0; @@ -1179,12 +1186,15 @@ protocol_error_unlock: protocol_error_free: kfree(ticket); protocol_error: + kfree(response); trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto); *_abort_code = abort_code; return -EPROTO; -temporary_error_free: +temporary_error_free_ticket: kfree(ticket); +temporary_error_free_resp: + kfree(response); temporary_error: /* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as * ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we