From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: Valentina Manea <valentina.manea.m@gmail.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 08:51:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180517065117.GA12910@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180516222200.GA14733@embeddedor.com>
On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 05:22:00PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
Nit, no need to line-wrap long error messages from tools :)
> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> ---
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> index 4880838..9045888 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
> #include <linux/platform_device.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
> +
> #include "usbip_common.h"
> #include "vhci.h"
>
> @@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ static ssize_t detach_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
> + rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
Shouldn't we just do this in one place, in the valid_port() function?
That way it keeps the range checking logic in one place (now it is in 3
places in the function), which should make maintenance much simpler.
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-17 6:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-16 22:22 [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-17 6:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-05-17 17:57 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-17 19:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-17 19:29 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180517065117.GA12910@kroah.com \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=gustavo@embeddedor.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-usb@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=valentina.manea.m@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox