From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] perf: Allow fine-grained PMU access control
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 11:05:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180522090527.GP12198@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180521092549.5349-1-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>
On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 10:25:49AM +0100, Tvrtko Ursulin wrote:
> From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
>
> For situations where sysadmins might want to allow different level of
> of access control for different PMUs, we start creating per-PMU
> perf_event_paranoid controls in sysfs.
Could you explain how exactly this makes sense?
For example, how does it make sense for one PMU to reveal kernel data
while another PMU is not allowed.
Once you allow one PMU to do so, the secret is out.
So please explain, in excruciating detail, how you want to use this and
how exactly that makes sense from a security pov.
> These work in equivalent fashion as the existing perf_event_paranoid
> sysctl, which now becomes the parent control for each PMU.
>
> On PMU registration the global/parent value will be inherited by each PMU,
> as it will be propagated to all registered PMUs when the sysctl is
> updated.
>
> At any later point individual PMU access controls, located in
> <sysfs>/device/<pmu-name>/perf_event_paranoid, can be adjusted to achieve
> fine grained access control.
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-22 9:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-21 9:25 [RFC] perf: Allow fine-grained PMU access control Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-05-22 9:05 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-05-22 9:29 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-05-22 12:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-22 13:01 ` Alexey Budankov
2018-05-22 17:19 ` Andi Kleen
2018-06-11 8:08 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-06-18 8:06 ` Alexey Budankov
2018-05-22 16:15 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-18 18:40 Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-01-19 16:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180522090527.GP12198@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net \
--to=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=acme@kernel.org \
--cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
--cc=jolsa@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=namhyung@kernel.org \
--cc=tursulin@ursulin.net \
--cc=tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox