From: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 4/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()
Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 17:58:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180524155803.GB19932@mailbox.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180523232538.4880-4-ebiederm@xmission.com>
On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 06:25:36PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
> read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
> also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
> towards the userns which originally mounted the filesystem.
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Note, I just talked to Serge. This should be Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 5f75969adff1..8ddd14806799 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -1590,7 +1590,7 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
> * Special case for "unmounting" root ...
> * we just try to remount it readonly.
> */
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> down_write(&sb->s_umount);
> if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
> @@ -2333,7 +2333,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
> down_write(&sb->s_umount);
> if (ms_flags & MS_BIND)
> err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, ms_flags);
> - else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + else if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> err = -EPERM;
> else
> err = do_remount_sb(sb, sb_flags, data, 0);
> --
> 2.14.1
>
> _______________________________________________
> Containers mailing list
> Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-24 15:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-23 23:22 [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/6] vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 12:58 ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 22:30 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/6] vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 13:55 ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 17:22 ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 19:12 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-23 23:41 ` [REVIEW][PATCH v2 " Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 22:30 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 4/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:58 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2018-05-24 16:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 17:28 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 5/6] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:57 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 6/6] fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:59 ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-24 21:46 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-24 23:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-25 3:57 ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-25 4:06 ` Darrick J. Wong
2018-05-29 13:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 22:17 ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-30 2:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30 4:34 ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-29 15:40 ` Dongsu Park
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