Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/3] bpf: add boot parameters for sysctl knobs

Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-05-25T16:49:22Z

On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 04:34:51PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 09:41:08AM +0200, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:
> > On Wed, 23 May 2018 15:02:45 -0700
> > Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 02:18:19PM +0200, Eugene Syromiatnikov wrote:
> > > > Some BPF sysctl knobs affect the loading of BPF programs, and during
> > > > system boot/init stages these sysctls are not yet configured.
> > > > A concrete example is systemd, that has implemented loading of BPF
> > > > programs.
> > > >
> > > > Thus, to allow controlling these setting at early boot, this patch set
> > > > adds the ability to change the default setting of these sysctl knobs
> > > > as well as option to override them via a boot-time kernel parameter
> > > > (in order to avoid rebuilding kernel each time a need of changing these
> > > > defaults arises).
> > > >
> > > > The sysctl knobs in question are kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disable,
> > > > net.core.bpf_jit_harden, and net.core.bpf_jit_kallsyms.
> > >
> > > - systemd is root. today it only uses cgroup-bpf progs which require root,
> > > so disabling unpriv during boot time makes no difference to systemd.
> > > what is the actual reason to present time?
systemd also runs a lot of code, some of which is unprivileged.

> > > - say in the future systemd wants to use so_reuseport+bpf for faster
> > > networking. With unpriv disable during boot, it will force systemd
> > > to do such networking from root, which will lower its security barrier.
No, it will force systemd not to use SO_REUSEPORT BPF.

> > > - bpf_jit_kallsyms sysctl has immediate effect on loaded programs.
> > > Flipping it during the boot or right after or any time after
> > > is the same thing. Why add such boot flag then?
Well, that one was for completeness.

> > > - jit_harden can be turned on by systemd. so turning it during the boot
> > > will make systemd progs to be constant blinded.
> > > Constant blinding protects kernel from unprivileged JIT spraying.
> > > Are you worried that systemd will attack the kernel with JIT spraying?
I'm worried that systemd can be exploited for a JIT spraying attack.

Another thing I'm concerned with is that the generated code is different,
which introduces additional complication during debugging.

> > I think you are missing that, we want the ability to change these
> > defaults in-order to avoid depending on /etc/sysctl.conf settings, and
> > that the these sysctl.conf setting happen too late.
>
> What does it mean 'happens too late' ?
> Too late for what?
> sysctl.conf has plenty of system critical knobs like
> kernel.perf_event_paranoid, kernel.core_pattern, etc
> The behavior of the host is drastically different after sysctl config
> is applied.
>
> > For example with jit_harden, there will be a difference between the
> > loaded BPF program that got loaded at boot-time with systemd (no
> > constant blinding) and when someone reloads that systemd service after
> > /etc/sysctl.conf have been evaluated and setting bpf_jit_harden (now
> > slower due to constant blinding). This is inconsistent behavior.
>
> net.core.bpf_jit_harden can be flipped back and forth at run-time,
> so bpf progs before and after will be either blinded or not.
> I don't see any inconsistency.

That can't be the reason to maintain that inconsistency.