From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 15:00:11 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180604200011.GC14454@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load
> and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must
> call an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data()
> in the original kexec_load syscall.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
> kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/kexec.h>
> #include <linux/mutex.h>
> #include <linux/list.h>
> @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
> static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
> unsigned long flags)
> {
> + int result;
> +
> /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
> return -EPERM;
>
> + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
> + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
> + if (result < 0)
> + return result;
> +
> /*
> * Verify we have a legal set of flags
> * This leaves us room for future extensions.
> --
> 2.7.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-04 20:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-29 18:01 [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 20:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 18:19 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 18:21 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 23:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v4 7/8] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 19:15 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:25 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-05 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-06 6:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-06-06 22:06 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-29 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 22:39 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-29 23:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-30 21:00 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-31 15:23 ` [PATCH v4a " Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:28 ` Paul Moore
2018-06-04 9:19 ` Jessica Yu
2018-06-05 19:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 21:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25 ` [PATCH v4 " Mimi Zohar
2018-05-30 2:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30 21:09 ` Paul Moore
2018-06-04 14:03 ` [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 4:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 12:19 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 13:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 13:43 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 14:05 ` Mimi Zohar
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