From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: "Alex Deucher" <alexander.deucher@amd.com>,
"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
"David (ChunMing) Zhou" <David1.Zhou@amd.com>,
"David Airlie" <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 11:32:32 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180723163232.GA17358@embeddedor.com> (raw)
idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c:408 amdgpu_set_pp_force_state()
warn: potential spectre issue 'data.states'
Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index data.states
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c
index 15a1192..a446c7c 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/power_supply.h>
#include <linux/hwmon.h>
#include <linux/hwmon-sysfs.h>
-
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
static int amdgpu_debugfs_pm_init(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ static ssize_t amdgpu_set_pp_force_state(struct device *dev,
count = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
+ idx = array_index_nospec(idx, ARRAY_SIZE(data.states));
amdgpu_dpm_get_pp_num_states(adev, &data);
state = data.states[idx];
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-07-23 16:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-23 16:32 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-07-24 20:53 ` [PATCH] drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix potential Spectre v1 Alex Deucher
2018-07-30 9:55 ` Michel Dänzer
2018-07-30 20:14 ` Alex Deucher
2018-07-31 6:46 ` Christian König
2018-07-31 21:29 ` Alex Deucher
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