From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04AACC6778A for ; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 12:01:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA3BD204EC for ; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 12:01:38 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org BA3BD204EC Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=ucw.cz Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388441AbeGXNHp (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Jul 2018 09:07:45 -0400 Received: from atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz ([195.113.26.193]:52181 "EHLO atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388248AbeGXNHp (ORCPT ); Tue, 24 Jul 2018 09:07:45 -0400 Received: by atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz (Postfix, from userid 512) id 2DA1380552; Tue, 24 Jul 2018 14:01:34 +0200 (CEST) Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 14:01:33 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: Yu Chen Cc: Oliver Neukum , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , "Lee, Chun-Yi" , Theodore Ts o , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" , "Zhang, Rui" Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Message-ID: <20180724120133.GD26036@amd> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="gE7i1rD7pdK0Ng3j" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --gE7i1rD7pdK0Ng3j Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi! > > > > "There have some functions be locked-down because > > > > there have no appropriate mechanisms to check the > > > > integrity of writing data." > > > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10476751/ > > >=20 > > > So your goal is to make hibernation compatible with kernel > > > lockdown? Do your patches provide sufficient security that hibernation > > > can be enabled with kernel lockdown? > >=20 > > OK, maybe I am dense, but if the key comes from user space, will that > > be enough? > >=20 > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this > should also be safe for encryption in kernel. Safe against what kind of attack? Please describe what kind of security you are trying to provide. I don't think generating key in userspace is good enough for providing guarantees for secure-boot. Pavel --=20 (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blo= g.html --gE7i1rD7pdK0Ng3j Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iEYEARECAAYFAltXFR0ACgkQMOfwapXb+vIR8gCfc62TqugayS53rcVP2MnxmUwN Y90AoJNYo4QqdyjaJNvfaQ4OiWXLKyF9 =X7DD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --gE7i1rD7pdK0Ng3j--