From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 468A8FD21E1 for ; Mon, 30 Jul 2018 17:04:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F260420892 for ; Mon, 30 Jul 2018 17:04:40 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org F260420892 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727509AbeG3Skd (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Jul 2018 14:40:33 -0400 Received: from smtp.nue.novell.com ([195.135.221.5]:53875 "EHLO smtp.nue.novell.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726762AbeG3Skd (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Jul 2018 14:40:33 -0400 Received: from linux-l9pv.suse (124-11-22-254.static.tfn.net.tw [124.11.22.254]) by smtp.nue.novell.com with ESMTP (TLS encrypted); Mon, 30 Jul 2018 19:04:27 +0200 Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2018 01:04:15 +0800 From: joeyli To: Oliver Neukum Cc: Yu Chen , Pavel Machek , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Eric Biggers , Theodore Ts o , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gu, Kookoo" , "Zhang, Rui" Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption Message-ID: <20180730170415.GQ4244@linux-l9pv.suse> References: <20180718202235.GA4132@amd> <20180718235851.GA22170@sandybridge-desktop> <20180719110149.GA4679@amd> <20180719132003.GA30981@sandybridge-desktop> <20180720102532.GA20284@amd> <1532346156.3057.11.camel@suse.com> <20180723162302.GA4503@sandybridge-desktop> <1532590246.7411.3.camel@suse.com> <20180726081404.GG4244@linux-l9pv.suse> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20180726081404.GG4244@linux-l9pv.suse> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi all, On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 04:14:04PM +0800, joeyli wrote: > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > > > > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people > > > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the > > > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this > > > should also be safe for encryption in kernel. > > > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html > > > Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from > > > user space. > > > > Hi, > > > > ecryptfs can trust user space. It is supposed to keep data > > safe while the system is inoperative. The whole point of Secure > > Boot is a cryptographic system of trust that does not include > > user space. > > > > I seriously doubt we want to use trusted computing here. So the > > key needs to be generated in kernel space and stored in a safe > > manner. As we have a saolution doing that, can we come to ausable > > synthesis? > > > > Regards > > Oliver > > Crurently there have two solutions, they are trusted key and EFI key. > Both of them are generated in kernel and are not visible in user space. > > The trusted key is generated by kernel then sealed by the TPM's > SRK. So the trusted key can be stored in anywhere then be enrolled > to kernel when we need it. EVM already uses it. > > The EFI key is Jiri Kosina's idea. It is stored in boot services > variable, which means that it can only be access by signed EFI binary > (e.g. signed EFI boot stub) when secure boot be enabled. SLE applied > this solution a couple of years. > > I am working on put the EFI key to key retention service. Then > EFI key can be a master key of encrypted key. EVM can also use > it: > https://github.com/joeyli/linux-s4sign/commit/bae39460393ada4c0226dd07cd5e3afcef86b71f > https://github.com/joeyli/linux-s4sign/commit/f552f97cc3cca5acd84f424b7f946ffb5fe8e9ec > > That's why I want to use key retention service in hibernation > encryption/authentication. Which means that we can use key > API to access trusted key and EFI key. > Here is a proof of concept for using the key retention service to encrypt/sign snapshot image. It's using EFI key now, I will add encrypted key support in the key handler later: https://github.com/joeyli/linux-s4sign/commit/6311e97038974bc5de8121769fb4d34470009566 My next step is that cleaning up the my EFI key type patches and submit it to EFI/keys subsystem ASAP. Then I will clean up my hibernation encryption/authentication solution for reviewing. Thanks Joey Lee