From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.17 17/31] x86/efi: Access EFI MMIO data as unencrypted when SEV is active
Date: Sat, 4 Aug 2018 11:00:52 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180804082633.586381045@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180804082632.304529527@linuxfoundation.org>
4.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
commit 9b788f32bee6b0b293a4bdfca4ad4bb0206407fb upstream.
SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
flash.
The following commit:
1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active")
unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data as 'encrypted' (C=1).
When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO
should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both guest and hypervisor can
access the data.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.15.x
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180720012846.23560-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memo
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-04 9:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-04 9:00 [PATCH 4.17 00/31] 4.17.13-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 01/31] bonding: avoid lockdep confusion in bond_get_stats() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 02/31] inet: frag: enforce memory limits earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 03/31] ipv4: frags: handle possible skb truesize change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 04/31] net: dsa: Do not suspend/resume closed slave_dev Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 05/31] netlink: Fix spectre v1 gadget in netlink_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 06/31] net: stmmac: Fix WoL for PCI-based setups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 07/31] rxrpc: Fix user call ID check in rxrpc_service_prealloc_one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 08/31] net/mlx5e: E-Switch, Initialize eswitch only if eswitch manager Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 09/31] net/mlx5e: Set port trust mode to PCP as default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 10/31] net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Set the netdevice sw mtu in ipoib enhanced flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 11/31] squashfs: more metadata hardening Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 13/31] can: ems_usb: Fix memory leak on ems_usb_disconnect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 14/31] net: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 15/31] net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadget in sock_is_registered Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 16/31] virtio_balloon: fix another race between migration and ballooning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 18/31] x86/apic: Future-proof the TSC_DEADLINE quirk for SKX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 19/31] x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 20/31] kvm: x86: vmx: fix vpid leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 21/31] audit: fix potential null dereference context->module.name Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 23/31] userfaultfd: remove uffd flags from vma->vm_flags if UFFD_EVENT_FORK fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:00 ` [PATCH 4.17 24/31] iwlwifi: add more card IDs for 9000 series Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:01 ` [PATCH 4.17 26/31] RDMA/uverbs: Expand primary and alt AV port checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:01 ` [PATCH 4.17 27/31] crypto: padlock-aes - Fix Nano workaround data corruption Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:01 ` [PATCH 4.17 28/31] drm/vc4: Reset ->{x, y}_scaling[1] when dealing with uniplanar formats Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:01 ` [PATCH 4.17 29/31] drm/atomic: Check old_plane_state->crtc in drm_atomic_helper_async_check() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:01 ` [PATCH 4.17 30/31] drm/atomic: Initialize variables in drm_atomic_helper_async_check() to make gcc happy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 9:01 ` [PATCH 4.17 31/31] scsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 14:49 ` [PATCH 4.17 00/31] 4.17.13-stable review Guenter Roeck
2018-08-05 6:54 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-05 11:50 ` Naresh Kamboju
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