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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 12/23] net: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall
Date: Sat,  4 Aug 2018 11:01:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180804082645.272860522@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180804082643.641435547@linuxfoundation.org>

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>

commit c8e8cd579bb4265651df8223730105341e61a2d1 upstream.

'call' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize the array index after the
bounds check to avoid speculating past the bounds of the 'nargs' array.

Found with the help of Smatch:

net/socket.c:2508 __do_sys_socketcall() warn: potential spectre issue
'nargs' [r] (local cap)

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/socket.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -2443,6 +2444,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(socketcall, int, call, u
 
 	if (call < 1 || call > SYS_SENDMMSG)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	call = array_index_nospec(call, SYS_SENDMMSG + 1);
 
 	len = nargs[call];
 	if (len > sizeof(a))



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-04  9:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-04  9:00 [PATCH 4.14 00/23] 4.14.61-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/23] bonding: avoid lockdep confusion in bond_get_stats() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/23] inet: frag: enforce memory limits earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/23] ipv4: frags: handle possible skb truesize change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/23] net: dsa: Do not suspend/resume closed slave_dev Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/23] netlink: Fix spectre v1 gadget in netlink_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/23] net: stmmac: Fix WoL for PCI-based setups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/23] rxrpc: Fix user call ID check in rxrpc_service_prealloc_one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:00 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/23] net/mlx5e: E-Switch, Initialize eswitch only if eswitch manager Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/23] squashfs: more metadata hardening Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/23] can: ems_usb: Fix memory leak on ems_usb_disconnect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/23] virtio_balloon: fix another race between migration and ballooning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/23] x86/apic: Future-proof the TSC_DEADLINE quirk for SKX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/23] x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/23] kvm: x86: vmx: fix vpid leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/23] audit: fix potential null dereference context->module.name Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/23] userfaultfd: remove uffd flags from vma->vm_flags if UFFD_EVENT_FORK fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/23] iwlwifi: add more card IDs for 9000 series Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/23] RDMA/uverbs: Expand primary and alt AV port checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/23] crypto: padlock-aes - Fix Nano workaround data corruption Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/23] drm/vc4: Reset ->{x, y}_scaling[1] when dealing with uniplanar formats Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04  9:01 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/23] scsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-04 14:48 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/23] 4.14.61-stable review Guenter Roeck
2018-08-05 11:51 ` Naresh Kamboju

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