From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>, Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com>
Cc: linux-hwmon@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] hwmon: (nct6775) Fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 08:14:37 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180815131437.GA25639@embeddedor.com> (raw)
val can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
vers/hwmon/nct6775.c:2698 store_pwm_weight_temp_sel() warn: potential
spectre issue 'data->temp_src' [r]
Fix this by sanitizing val before using it to index data->temp_src
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/hwmon/nct6775.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/nct6775.c b/drivers/hwmon/nct6775.c
index c6bd61e..944f5b6 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/nct6775.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/nct6775.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "lm75.h"
#define USE_ALTERNATE
@@ -2689,6 +2690,7 @@ store_pwm_weight_temp_sel(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
return err;
if (val > NUM_TEMP)
return -EINVAL;
+ val = array_index_nospec(val, NUM_TEMP + 1);
if (val && (!(data->have_temp & BIT(val - 1)) ||
!data->temp_src[val - 1]))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-08-15 13:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-15 13:14 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-08-15 20:43 ` [PATCH] hwmon: (nct6775) Fix potential Spectre v1 Guenter Roeck
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