From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: VMware Graphics <linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com>,
Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>,
Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] drm/vmwgfx: Fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2018 14:30:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180816193015.GA12093@embeddedor.com> (raw)
arg.version is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c:4526 vmw_execbuf_ioctl() warn:
potential spectre issue 'copy_offset' [w]
Fix this by sanitizing arg.version before using it to index copy_offset
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
index 1f13457..ad91c6e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
*
**************************************************************************/
#include <linux/sync_file.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "vmwgfx_drv.h"
#include "vmwgfx_reg.h"
@@ -4520,8 +4521,10 @@ int vmw_execbuf_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long data,
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (arg.version > 1 &&
- copy_from_user(&arg.context_handle,
+ if (arg.version >= ARRAY_SIZE(copy_offset))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ arg.version = array_index_nospec(arg.version, ARRAY_SIZE(copy_offset));
+ if (copy_from_user(&arg.context_handle,
(void __user *) (data + copy_offset[0]),
copy_offset[arg.version - 1] -
copy_offset[0]) != 0)
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-08-16 19:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-16 19:30 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-08-20 20:53 ` [Linux-graphics-maintainer] [PATCH] drm/vmwgfx: Fix potential Spectre v1 Deepak Singh Rawat
2018-08-21 8:19 ` Thomas Hellstrom
2018-08-23 14:43 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
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