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From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>,
	Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@bootlin.com>,
	Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run>, David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] drm/bufs: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 11:55:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181016095549.GA23586@embeddedor.com> (raw)

idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c:1420 drm_legacy_freebufs() warn: potential
spectre issue 'dma->buflist' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index dma->buflist

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c
index 7412aca..d7d10ca 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
 #include <drm/drmP.h>
 #include "drm_legacy.h"
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 static struct drm_map_list *drm_find_matching_map(struct drm_device *dev,
 						  struct drm_local_map *map)
 {
@@ -1417,6 +1419,7 @@ int drm_legacy_freebufs(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 				  idx, dma->buf_count - 1);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		idx = array_index_nospec(idx, dma->buf_count);
 		buf = dma->buflist[idx];
 		if (buf->file_priv != file_priv) {
 			DRM_ERROR("Process %d freeing buffer not owned\n",
-- 
2.7.4


             reply	other threads:[~2018-10-16 10:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-16  9:55 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-10-17  7:19 ` [PATCH] drm/bufs: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Daniel Vetter
2018-10-17 10:35   ` Gustavo A. R. Silva

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