From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3E77C0044C for ; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 23:09:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BA772081B for ; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 23:09:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="pDHnLg4x" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8BA772081B Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730657AbeKAIJt (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2018 04:09:49 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59960 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730626AbeKAIJr (ORCPT ); Thu, 1 Nov 2018 04:09:47 -0400 Received: from sasha-vm.mshome.net (c-73-47-72-35.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.47.72.35]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C491F20664; Wed, 31 Oct 2018 23:09:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541027376; bh=Q8PWVI/Q6kVjAGlTRqiIvGRgFQZpEYIyE//7dRYMANI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=pDHnLg4xtPfaJBgqwfTZfvaXyJEwhgu6N0Yu+xLZHVWSf1LZvsH0WDnsz4O8pkYIP 7Tublf9b+DUwM4Ys36+RSfsN4esp6EK/kCKaBbcwuTojOSOAQpyr2hR3kF2N1u98Ks xqcT+3DzUIm1D9vVcQWG/QlcJ/NijprFy5VQazaA= From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Casey Schaufler , Casey Schaufler , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.18 113/126] Smack: ptrace capability use fixes Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 19:07:41 -0400 Message-Id: <20181031230754.29029-113-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20181031230754.29029-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20181031230754.29029-1-sashal@kernel.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Casey Schaufler [ Upstream commit dcb569cf6ac99ca899b8109c128b6ae52477a015 ] This fixes a pair of problems in the Smack ptrace checks related to checking capabilities. In both cases, as reported by Lukasz Pawelczyk, the raw capability calls are used rather than the Smack wrapper that check addition restrictions. In one case, as reported by Jann Horn, the wrong task is being checked for capabilities. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 8b6cd5a79bfa..a81d815c81f3 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL; struct task_smack *tsp; struct smack_known *tracer_known; + const struct cred *tracercred; if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) { smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); @@ -428,7 +429,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, } rcu_read_lock(); - tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security; + tracercred = __task_cred(tracer); + tsp = tracercred->security; tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp); if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) && @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, rc = 0; else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN) rc = -EACCES; - else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred)) rc = 0; else rc = -EACCES; @@ -1840,6 +1842,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, { struct smack_known *skp; struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security); + const struct cred *tcred; struct file *file; int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; @@ -1853,8 +1856,12 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, skp = file->f_security; rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL); rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc); - if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + + rcu_read_lock(); + tcred = __task_cred(tsk); + if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred)) rc = 0; + rcu_read_unlock(); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk); -- 2.17.1