From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54178C43441 for ; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 22:38:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1884420844 for ; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 22:38:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Hr8QGMxh" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1884420844 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729437AbeKIHet (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Nov 2018 02:34:49 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51562 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726834AbeKIHes (ORCPT ); Fri, 9 Nov 2018 02:34:48 -0500 Received: from localhost (unknown [208.72.13.198]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 661932133D; Thu, 8 Nov 2018 21:57:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541714240; bh=b399HwPrZieQ+Yb2g7aHAzOW0bKRRjBqX8KQgXHZF8U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Hr8QGMxh3dS40jwGOCFzfaJnfphGtgwRZ/G/T4OyTTvwXJfp1kDk6D4YSrSdBNNbs huzKqJn9p8d3g8B0p/XYN8W38emmRJ7bEsGzxTSM+m/zYZfxspgrQArAdSkZ7K4yIS pD18M0ow64+WVVqHVQ2AnaByXPpPqS2Z85s2bulI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Wenwen Wang , "David S. Miller" Subject: [PATCH 3.18 134/144] net: socket: fix a missing-check bug Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 13:51:45 -0800 Message-Id: <20181108215107.849934387@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181108215054.826084593@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20181108215054.826084593@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Wenwen Wang [ Upstream commit b6168562c8ce2bd5a30e213021650422e08764dc ] In ethtool_ioctl(), the ioctl command 'ethcmd' is checked through a switch statement to see whether it is necessary to pre-process the ethtool structure, because, as mentioned in the comment, the structure ethtool_rxnfc is defined with padding. If yes, a user-space buffer 'rxnfc' is allocated through compat_alloc_user_space(). One thing to note here is that, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL, the size of the buffer 'rxnfc' is partially determined by 'rule_cnt', which is actually acquired from the user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc', i.e., 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt', through get_user(). After 'rxnfc' is allocated, the data in the original user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc' is then copied to 'rxnfc' through copy_in_user(), including the 'rule_cnt' field. However, after this copy, no check is re-enforced on 'rxnfc->rule_cnt'. So it is possible that a malicious user race to change the value in the 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt' between these two copies. Through this way, the attacker can bypass the previous check on 'rule_cnt' and inject malicious data. This can cause undefined behavior of the kernel and introduce potential security risk. This patch avoids the above issue via copying the value acquired by get_user() to 'rxnfc->rule_cn', if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL. Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/socket.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -2918,9 +2918,14 @@ static int ethtool_ioctl(struct net *net copy_in_user(&rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie, &compat_rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie, (void __user *)(&rxnfc->fs.location + 1) - - (void __user *)&rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie) || - copy_in_user(&rxnfc->rule_cnt, &compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt, - sizeof(rxnfc->rule_cnt))) + (void __user *)&rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie)) + return -EFAULT; + if (ethcmd == ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL) { + if (put_user(rule_cnt, &rxnfc->rule_cnt)) + return -EFAULT; + } else if (copy_in_user(&rxnfc->rule_cnt, + &compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt, + sizeof(rxnfc->rule_cnt))) return -EFAULT; }