From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: STIBP by default.. Revert?
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 04:48:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181119034846.GA11333@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <32d00fb2-7187-ed6f-ab1e-287151e82b3a@linux.intel.com>
On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 02:40:28PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> Tasks that want extra security will enable that via prctl interface or
> making themselves non-dumpable.
Well, you need to be careful regarding the last part of your option
above, because a number of network daemons become non-dumpable by
executing setuid() at boot, and certainly don't want to suffer a
performance loss as a side effect of wanting to become "normally"
secure. I'd suggest to use the prctl only so that it doesn't
randomly hit innocent applications that would only have as a last
resort to turn off reasonable security features to avoid this impact.
Regards,
Willy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-19 3:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-18 20:36 STIBP by default.. Revert? Linus Torvalds
2018-11-18 21:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 21:59 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-11-18 22:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-18 22:17 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 22:35 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-18 22:36 ` Tony Luck
2018-11-18 22:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-18 22:55 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-18 23:56 ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-18 22:40 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-18 23:58 ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-19 3:48 ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2018-11-19 12:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-18 23:01 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 23:04 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-11-20 15:27 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 23:43 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-11-19 8:38 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 8:43 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20 15:20 ` Jiri Kosina
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